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PROTESTANT DISSENT AS CRIME (1660-1828)*

CHARLES F. MULLETT

Professor of History, University of Missouri

AT SIX O'CLOCK in the evening of June 18, 1828, the anniversary of Waterloo, four hundred people, with a royal duke[1] in the chair and the galleries filled with ladies, sat down to celebrate their recent success—the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts. This notable company of assorted Dissenters, Catholics, and Anglicans remained in "undiminished numbers to the last." Before they drank their final toast, "a long pull, a strong pull, and a pull all together," at half-past one, they had toasted "every man's right and every nation's best interest—liberty of conscience," and speedy relief to all others suffering disabilities; they had toasted the persons instrumental in the repeal, the memory of by-gone adherents, education without subscription, and liberty of the press. Each toast called forth the most noble sentiments, the most hopeful predictions. On every side the speakers denounced intolerance and all its agents, and applauded *this* evidence of religious freedom and Christian charity.[2]

Well may these men have celebrated. Repeal was a triumph of no mean proportions. If Dissenters were far from complete citizenship, they were, in one step, farther from the outlawry and humiliation of the preceding 170 years. The Toleration Act, a few lesser statutes, the decisions of Lord Mansfield and other enlightened judges had partially redeemed them from outer darkness; the present repeal took them into the light. What was more, though at the moment they knew it not,

* This paper was presented at the Cleveland meeting of the American Historical Association, December, 1947, as part of a session entitled "Religious Dissent: A Central Theme in English History." The author is greatly indebted to the Social Science Research Council for a grant which facilitated this study.

1. The Duke of Sussex (1773-1843) was perhaps the one exception among the sons of George III to Wellington's characterization, "the damnedest millstones ever hung about a nation's neck." He steadily supported such reforms as abolition of the slave trade, repeal of the corn laws, and removal of disabilities on Catholics, Protestant Dissenters, and Jews. He also served as president of the Royal Society, 1830-1838.

2. *Report of the Speeches and Proceedings at a Dinner to commemorate the abolition of the Sacramental Test,* "taken in shorthand by Mr. [Joseph] Gurney" (London, 1828).

Catholic Emancipation, the Reform Act, municipal reform, the less publicized but pertinent statutes concerning charities and oaths, and some beneficial court decisions would soon give far greater meaning to the victory they were hailing with one long pull after another.

For years the common and canon law, the Clarendon Code, the ordinances of municipalities, universities, Inns of Court, and guilds, and the courts had chained them in a slavery that was no easier for being relatively bloodless.[3] To be classified with adulterers, sodomites, and sorcerers, to experience a capricious respite through the Indemnity Acts, to be deprived of a hundred opportunities for conscience sake was, perhaps, not persecution as Mary Tudor or John Calvin applied it, but to its victims the chains were as galling as though they had been attended by inquisitorial tortures.

The history of Dissent is the evolution from outlawry to citizenship. To be sure, nonconformity had long suffered disabilities. If the common law did not make Dissent a crime, it did punish disturbance of peace; canon law excommunicated those who worshiped apart from the Establishment; and a miscellany of Tudor-Stuart enactments, by fines, imprisonment, banishment, and even death, penalized non-payment of tithes, refusal to take oaths of supremacy and allegiance, and failure to attend church or have one's children baptized according to Anglican rites. Although originally intended against Catholics, this legislation soon applied to Protestant Dissenters. Then the Clarendon Code, by defining, greatly intensified their burdens; and many a Dissenter must soon have recalled with bitter irony the thanksgiving of May 29, 1660 for the restoration of "the public and free profession of true religion and worship."

The Restoration enactments can quickly be summarized. The Corporation Act cut Dissenters out of municipal governments, and, though eased in 1718 and 1767, it survived until 1828 as one of the twin peaks which Dissenters were perpetually seeking, and as perpetually failing, to conquer. A second act prohibited Quakers' meetings and penalized their refusal to take oaths. The Uniformity Act drove Presbyterians

3. For a convenient statement of the precise disabilities and their frequent application, see the present writer's accounts in the *Virginia Law Review:* "The Corporation Act and the Election of English Protestant Dissenters to Corporation Offices," XXI (1935), 641-64; "The Legal Position of English Protestant Dissenters," XXII (1936), 495-526; XXIII (1937), 389-418; XXV (1939), 671-97; and in the *Missouri Law Review,* "Lord Mansfield and English Dissenters," II (1937), 46-62.

from the church and the universities. The Conventicle Acts prevented freedom of worship. The Five Mile Act excluded Dissenting ministers from corporate towns and halted their careers as schoolmasters. The Test Act, though aimed at Catholics, soon disabled Protestant Dissenters from political opportunities and severely limited their right to sue, serve as guardian or executor, and inherit property. Simultaneously, orders in council sharpened or even prefaced the general prohibitions which judicial decisions soon extended into spheres unanticipated at their passage, to "the strangest consequence from the remotest cause."

Of all, the Conventicle orders caused the greatest distress. They attacked the spiritual integrity of Dissenters; they were most commonly violated and most easily enforced. The Fifth Monarchy uprising early in 1661 and Quaker denial of civil authority served immediately to identify conventicles with sedition. Moreover, because many "mongrel" justices were for Oliver and proceeded coldly to their duty, the king's government must needs suppress such assemblies, and, in 1662, a rumored conspiracy caused many arrests of nonconformists. Shortly after, when the prospect of indulgence encouraged Dissenters to meet openly, conformists in great terror expected "nightly to have their throats cut by the Presbyterians." Although Matthew Hale, chief baron of the Exchequer and later Chief Justice of the King's Bench, insisted that the Conventicle Act was not directly against religious meetings, too many people believed that a conventicle must be seditious. The plague, the fire, and the Dutch War intensified that conviction and prompted a detailed catalogue of all conventicles in and about London.

The Clarendon Code cut Dissenters off from responsible political activity, stigmatized them as criminals, and denied them the traditional rights of Englishmen. They protested by pamphlet and petition; they lobbied; they tested by litigation; they turned the other cheek. No tactics improved their status. The union of throne and altar, with its corollary ideals of political and ecclesiastical orthodoxy, erected a barrier against which private judgment in religion and independence in politics could only butt in vain. To many of the lately disinherited, the ship of state, "after a leap toward shipwreck on the seas," was righted and protected by God himself.

Fortunately, during these years persecution ebbed as well as flowed. The most tenuous rumor of indulgence at once slackened enforcement

and encouraged the "diabolical rabble" in their insolent insistence on a "brutish liberty of conscience." Such "cattle" as Quakers, such "vermin" as Baptists then swarmed to conventicles. Quickly a reaction followed. To conformists' delight, the distillers of religious poison and preachers of sedition were thrust into prison to suffer wretched food, harsh blows, and constant abuse. Even when the government blew hot and cold, when laws were unenforced and proclamations lapsed, some person with a grievance or some Dissenter hopeful that the calm bespoke favor would test a particular issue in the courts, invariably with results painful to nonconformity. Yet relief came, even if slowly, sometimes as much by the promise of a bright new day as by a specific gain.

Long before the Toleration Act eased tender consciences, bills sought to relieve some or all religious dissidents; accompanying these were innumerable tracts defending concessions. Such a spirit was actually apparent in high places during the very years of penal enactments. In 1661, Edward Stillingfleet, later Bishop of Worcester, Richard Baxter, and Charles II, who probably agreed on nothing else, voiced the doctrine of peace, but the feverish clamor for revenge smothered their pleas. Their failure reduced Presbyterians to equality with the sectaries. In the long run, this was a gain for nonconformity, but because Presbyterians had sought special favors, they were now distrusted by the sectaries as much as they were disliked by Episcopalians. Yet no sooner was Episcopalian dislike implemented by statutes, than the Lords considered bills for easing ecclesiastical tension, and for twenty-five years no long interval passed without some such gesture. At first the Presbyterians were the prospective beneficiaries, to be redeemed by comprehension within the Church of England. But such a limited program could scarcely succeed; stalwart Anglicans and jealous Dissenters alike opposed it. Later on, influenced by earlier failures, the Presbyterians broadened their platform to include toleration for moderate Dissenters and some indulgence to Catholics. The fear that popery might come on England on the shoulders of a Puritan was only one reason for another defeat.

Hostility in Parliament and the press, however, did not mean a complete lack of favor. Many men preferred oil to vinegar and compromise to persecution. They applauded the principle if not the mode of Charles's Declaration of Indulgence, and during its existence Dissent

acquired a footing that subsequent hostility could not dislodge. The Test Act was accompanied and followed by relief bills for Protestant Dissenters, bills that emphasized toleration rather than comprehension. They failed, and the fanaticism engendered by the Popish and Presbyterian Plots promised no immediate success. A somewhat improved situation marked the reign of James II, but his motives excited so much suspicion that many Dissenters neither dared nor desired to take the branch he extended. With the Revolution, comprehension and the removal of sacramental tests were completely defeated, but toleration of worship was gained with ease and a larger toleration implied.

The parallel struggle for comprehension and toleration mirrored the contrasting character of Presbyterians and sectaries, whose differences extended beyond church government to fundamental disagreement about doctrines. In 1660, Presbyterians conceived themselves an integral part of the Establishment and, after the Uniformity Act, looked hopefully to the day when the Anglicans would remedy the error and once more comprehend them. Comprehension in Presbyterian and Anglican circles derived from fear of popery on one side and anarchic separatism on the other; it appeared the answer to disunity in church and state alike. In the final test, however, a broader toleration triumphed, and comprehension became almost a historical curiosity.[4]

The meaning of toleration and of its absence becomes clearer on the examination of court judgments. The Corporation Act was especially significant here. Not only were Dissenters dismissed and debarred from office for refusal to subscribe the required oaths, but they suffered a double penalty because corporation by-laws required a nominee to stand and an elected person to serve, irrespective of his sacramental qualifications, or pay a huge fine. Dissenters could only serve if they qualified themselves by a repugnant procedure and so were repeatedly mulcted of huge sums. Other instances abound. An Anabaptist tract was held a malicious libel on the Common Prayer, and its author was imprisoned, pilloried, and bullied. A court judged Richard Baxter's

4. It has gained some support at widely scattered intervals since 1689 from such diverse personalities as Edmund Gibson, Bishop of London, in the eighteenth century; Thomas Arnold, in the nineteenth; and Hensley Henson, Bishop of Durham, in the twentieth. Moreover, it seems definitely on the road to partial achievement in our day.

paraphrase of the New Testament a seditious libel, fined him £500, and required security of good behavior for seven years. A conservative statement of religious grievances brought indictment for sedition upon author, reader, and the owner of the coffee-house where such was circulated. Sometimes these offenses were classified as libel, sometimes as high treason; the penalties might be protracted imprisonment or a heavy fine. Nonconformist ministers and congregations were denied legacies on the ground of superstitious uses and seditious purposes; trusts were forbidden; a Dissenter, in one case, was not permitted to farm church lands. After all, what were these Dissenters but "a company of rude, illiterate, base fellows" who, as "fantastic old great" Robert Burton put it, "how wise soever in their own conceits," neither thought, spoke, nor wrote well of God.

Quakers were specially victimized, and denied almost every civil right. The recognition that their marriages were legal was the only beam that penetrated the dark cloud of their persecution. Even when litigation was easing the conscience and the material welfare of other Dissenters, Quakers still suffered; their refusal to take oaths made it easier to decide against them. Although, as time went on, the right of Quakers to make affirmation in civil causes gave tolerant judges an opportunity to place many causes in this category, they were for years denied much of the protection which the Toleration Act conceded to the main Dissenting bodies.

The Toleration Act, so often flung in the faces of the Dissenters as *the* final concession, constantly revealed its shortcomings as well as its positive value. Freedom of worship meant little without full social and political opportunities, since uniformity and conformity still summed up government policy and nonconformity was penalized on every hand. In times of crisis or fanaticism the act's weakness came to light. Then liberty of conscience was denounced as the mother of confusion, and even moderates believed that an unlimited toleration would soon extinguish all true religion. In 1705, the Lords insisted that dangers abroad required unity at home, and that no Dissenter should hold responsible office. So mercurial was opinion, however, that the same body was soon describing Dissenters as too divided to threaten the church or state: toleration made converts, and foreign dangers and business alike required leniency.

If the Toleration Act enabled the government to wash its hands of

religion, it did not free Dissenters from surveillance. Its conditions—oaths of allegiance, licenses to congregation and ministers, and conformity to the Conventicle and Five Mile Acts—were rigorously enforced, and persecuting acts were still possible: the Blasphemy Act (1698) disabled anti-Trinitarians, on first conviction, from holding any office and, on second conviction, from the right to sue or be a guardian of any child; the Occasional Conformity Act (1711) fined officials for attending conventicles once they had taken the Anglican sacrament;[5] the Schism Act (1713) required conformity of schoolmasters. Other policies betoken the revival of oppression as when, in 1711, Dissenters were threatened with banishment from London and, in 1722, with more persecution than they had ever known. Meanwhile, the picture was not entirely dark. In 1696, a statute permitted Quakers to substitute affirmation for oaths in civil cases, though it heavily penalized their refusal to pay tithes; in 1718, the repeal of the Occasional Conformity and Schism Acts was accompanied by a gesture against the Test and Corporation Acts; and, in 1727, the Indemnity Act, however faulty in principle, was a left-handed admission of injustice.[6]

On the other hand, the textbooks were labelling nonconformity a crime. Hawkins, whose *Pleas of the Crown* first appeared in 1716, classed it with witchcraft, sodomy, blasphemy, and drunkenness; six years later, Wood's *Institute* made the same attributions, and successive editions made no change. Blackstone's usual "honeyed Mansfieldism" turned to vinegar as he listed nonconformity with heresy, sorcery, and open and notorious lewdness, in the very days when Mansfield's resounding utterances were most benefitting Dissent. Nonetheless, the textbooks reflected the views of many justices who, if they did not always penalize, were reluctant to favor Dissenters. If the law was not clear, to urge that one party frequented conventicles might turn the decision against him. If the contemporary climate of opinion was hos-

5. A bill of this sort had come before the Commons in 1701. At the same time, Edward Chamberlayne was denouncing those "foolish and inconsiderate people" who, holding "communion with the national Church and with their own particular sect at the same time," were guilty of "inconsistency and prevarication with God and man, especially if it appears to be done upon a selfish and temporal account" *Angliae Notitia, or the Present State of England* (London, 20th ed., 1702), 255 ff.

6. The Indemnity Acts, passed annually from this time forward, pardoned violators of the penal laws; such a tactic repeatedly called to Dissenters' minds the Damoclean sword.

tile to Dissenters, a suit would be decided accordingly, whereas in a more tolerant day the courts would be lenient. Irrespective of hostility or friendship, many cases were important because they defined ever more clearly the personality of Dissent and thus enhanced its legal status. To deny a writ would be to deny status, to put Dissenters outside the law, and that—to the mind even of stout conformists—must not be done.

No sooner did Dissenters appreciate the very real limitations of the Toleration Act through new persecutions and court decisions than they inaugurated a campaign for its extension. When they sought to trade votes for liberty they turned to the Whigs as more likely allies, but this party repeatedly let them down, to the sharp jibes of the Tories. Yet the Whigs were at least willing to talk toleration, and Dissenters saw no hope in the party which was always ready to denounce them as a busy and indefatigable generation of vipers. After scattered and individual efforts had produced nothing, Baptist, Congregational, and Presbyterian ministers organized a union in 1727, the year of the first Indemnity Act; after five years laymen joined it. The union inaugurated relief drives in 1732, 1736, and 1739. The first did not go beyond agitation which, in turn, excited several warnings and denunciations. The parliamentary efforts in 1736 and 1739 failed by large margins.

Contemporaneously, Quakers moved for relief from tithes: hundreds had gone to prison, where some had died and many had lost huge sums in costs or distraint. Their bill passed the Commons, but failed in the Lords. Thereafter no concerted relief drive of any sort took place until the 1770's. Then, perhaps prompted by some notable court triumphs in the 60's, Dissenters sought a larger, and statutory definition of relief. Emphatic failure, apart from the concession in 1779 that freed Dissenting ministers and schoolmasters from the necessity of subscribing the articles, provided they declared themselves Christians and Protestants, drove them again to the courts, although they soon discovered that they were better off out of the public eye.

Toward the end of the eighteenth century, exciting social, intellectual, and political factors produced an unusual crop of ideas. The exact influence of middle class power, rationalism, relief drives, and the American and French Revolutions is of course conjectural, yet these factors all shook the foundations of church and state. The increased power of the middle class strengthened Dissenters; the revolu-

tions supplied the catchwords of liberty; rationalism and the struggles for relief aroused "The Church in Danger," and her spokesmen assaulted Dissenters for seeking to introduce infidelity and democracy on every hand.

To aggravate the situation, the Dissenting drives of the early 70's paralleled a campaign within the Establishment to relax subscription, the failure of which drove several leaders into Unitarian ranks, where Dissenters steadily joined them. Indeed, the phrase of St. Jerome hits off English Protestantism at this era; it "awoke and groaned to find itself Arian." John Newton, slave trader and evangelical, lamented that even the Methodist revival did not balance the defection among Dissenters, for the Presbyterians permitted the most contemptuous and malignant opposition to the gospel, and the Independents were on tiptoes to follow them.[7]

The 1780's continued to emphasize ecclesiastical affairs, as internal riots and military defeat convinced many that without some toleration the country risked a revolution, with the Presbyterians a greater threat than the Papists. The revolution and toleration took the form of several drives for the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts. Despite considerable organization, numerous petitions and pamphlets, and brilliant advocacy in Parliament, the efforts only created hostility. In and out of Parliament, men argued that the acts deprived Englishmen of their rights, reflected on their patriotism and Protestantism, and profaned a sacred ordinance; more generally they praised toleration as ideally good and practically sound. On the other side, first rationalism and then revolution was adduced as evidence that the Test and Corporation Acts alone blocked the confiscation of church property, a civil constitution of the clergy, the rights of man, and their whole Saturnalian aftermath. Such a conclusion had a complete validity to a generation that saw Brissot shouldered aside by Danton, and anticipated that, if Priestley were tolerated, Paine would dictate. The throne and the altar were crumbling in France. Why not also in England? So fearful, indeed, was this generation that it transferred its hostility from the pope to Voltaire, from Romanism to rationalism.

7. *Hist. Mss. Comm. Report* (1896), xv, pt. i, 200. The Anglican petition for release from subscription excited an intense pamphlet war as well as parliamentary debate, with the petitioners denounced as atheists and hypocrites who would leave the Church naked and defenseless.

Although, during the Revolution, Parliament did not further handicap Dissenters, private citizens and country justices redressed that omission. Riotous assemblies broke windows and heads, and justices considered all Dissenters rogues until they had proved themselves honest men—which they could best do by recantation. What was immediately less painful, but for the future more threatening, was the stricter enforcement and interpretation of existing law and the prospect of new burdens.

More judgments went against Dissenters between 1790 and 1812 than in the previous century, and even those in their favor illustrated the hazards surrounding them. Especially were the Corporation Act and the limiting conditions in the Toleration Act strictly applied, so that Dissenters constantly feared the rigorous enforcement of *every* penal statute. Some sects, of course, suffered more than others. Tories regarded the wild and dangerous opinions of the Unitarians as the harbinger of the tumbrils, and denounced Quaker opposition to the tithe as an attempt to pick the pockets of good citizens in order to gratify the pretended scruples of bad ones. The small litigious victories made by other sects were less a step forward than the bracing of a position painfully reached and painfully maintained.

The first positive relief came in 1812. A bill to relieve Dissenters and the Lords' consideration of Catholic emancipation were temporarily postponed by the assassination of Perceval in 1812, but the issue did not die, and, in 1812-13, Parliament enacted three relief acts. The first entirely repealed the Five Mile Act, largely repealed the Conventicle Act, and broadened the section of the Toleration Act relating to ministerial licenses. The second removed the sting from excommunication. The third extended the Toleration Act to Unitarians. Simultaneously, the courts changed their temper, even though Dissenters did not invariably win all their suits.

During the 20's, relief measures large and small aroused constant debate. An unsuccessful effort to concede to Catholics and the chief Protestant Dissenting bodies the marriage privileges long enjoyed by Jews and Quakers prompted Lord Ellenborough to express pain at seeing "the right rev. bench always indisposed" to relieve tender consciences. The subsequent failure of this issue as regards Unitarians enabled Lord Holland to recall someone's wonderment that the vast ocean could produce the sprat, and to ridicule the commotion aroused

by this small concession. The repeal of the Corporation and Test Acts, petitioned in 1824, was steadily agitated during the next four years, with the same arguments in and out of Parliament that had been voiced these many years.[8] Though many disabilities survived repeal, the Dissenters could now rejoice that their outlawry and criminality had passed.

Religious and political change went hand in hand. As orthodoxy had enacted penal laws, so the declining fear of Jacobinism permitted reform in both areas, even though Cassandras confidently, even hopefully, foretold the collapse of English civilization to the level of America, where blasphemy and fanaticism had free rein. Such anticipation was not wholly unfounded. With toleration officially enacted, the Church stood at the mercy of those who resented her privileges and her property. The Tractatians, clearly if not entirely, were aroused by the prospect of Disestablishment. Ever since 1828 many Englishmen have boldly declared that the steady repulse of the Church from realms once peculiarly her own is the inevitable sequel of that era. Such men, furthermore, have not hesitated to insist that nothing else could have been anticipated from permitting Baptists and Libertines to debate the doctrines and discipline of the Establishment.

Circumstances and opinions of this sort make Dissent a central theme in English History. A Dissenter's religious loyalty modified his whole position as man and citizen. To disregard this is to disregard what Lord Acton called "the remunerative but perilous region where religion and politics conflict, where ideas and institutions are as much considered as persons and events, and history is charged with all the elements of fixity, development, and change."[9] The denial of rights and privileges to a large portion of the community affected business, the professions, expansion, and education as well as politics and religion. Cut off from most professions, which were thereby impoverished, Dissenters turned to business and the colonies. Cut off from univer-

8. *The Test-Act Reporter; or, Report of Proceedings in the late application to Parliament for the Repeal of the Corporation and Test Acts: including Parliamentary Debates and Public Documents. To which are added, The Statement of the Case of the Protestant Dissenters, and an Abstract of the Corporation and Test Acts* (London, 1829). In 1826, the Tories held out the promise of some relief to Dissenters in return for support at the polls, but they stopped short of repeal, the only expression of relief that interested Dissenters.

9. *The History of Freedom and other Essays* (London, 1909), p. 551.

sities, they developed educational facilities of their own, partly to make a living, more to perpetuate their ideals.[10] Here they welcomed the new philosophy and science and new techniques in teaching; such arsenals of revolutionary ideas at once excited mob attacks and rationalist approval. Cut off from civic rights and privileges, Dissenters worked assiduously for toleration and democracy; and that great area of political theory, Church and State, would lose half its crop and most of its interest were it not for Dissent. Despised and rejected by both, nonetheless, it had a tremendous impact on each.

The "disinherited" of the old order became the progenitors of the new, but the new order had to make its way slowly, and the scorn directed at "trade" owed something to a historic connection with Dissent. The rivalry between Church and Dissent reflected the struggle between aristocracy and middle class, agriculture and commerce, rural and urban society. How much did the insistence on the Corporation Act derive from Dissenter's concentration in boroughs? Were factory owners loath to accept state regulation merely for economic reasons, or did their Dissenting environment prompt resentment at the interference of a government traditionally identified with the Establishment?

Dissent could be harsh. It was, after all a "resistance," and persecution neither widens nor mellows: "the wrath of man worketh not the righteousness of God"; and bitter adversity at times stiffened pride into arrogance. Yet this austere product of rationalism, persecution, and piety did seek political and social reform with an intensity born of its own misfortunes. It became the ultimate in sobriety; it deplored slavery, monopolies, the Corn Laws, Peterloo. It favored parliamentary reform, chartism, the co-operative movement, mechanics institutes; and, one sect, the Quakers, among other noble achievements, inaugurated humane intelligence toward crime and insanity.

Neither the "lunatic fringe" nor Catholics, Jews, and Methodists have received their due here, but certainly no religious minority failed in one way or another to figure in the picture.[11] If it was too tiny to

10. H. McLachlan, *English Education under the Test Acts* (Manchester, 1931); I. Parker, *Dissenting Academies in England* (Cambridge, 1914).

11. The position of Catholics reveals to what extent there were degrees in outlawry, for they lived in a corrosive insecurity that brought despair and isolation. They attempted less litigation and fewer relief drives, since such tests often served only to rivet their chains. For some attention to the less obvious features of their

interest the Privy Council, it aroused the justices of the peace. Potentially, a concession to one was a concession to all; an affront to one, an affront to all. Persecuting laws and mob violence showed no discrimination. Yet with all the assaults, there were many defenders—often outside the Dissenting ranks—and for every charge of blasphemy, sedition, or ritual murder a reply emphasized sobriety, industry, and community spirit. Moreover, not all is serious: one pamphleteer reminded Dissenters that they could get piles as quickly in the playhouse as in church, and suggested to his fellow Anglicans that the best way to win them back was to introduce spicy music in church.

Scratch an Englishman, says Shaw, and you find a Protestant. Scratch a little deeper and you find a Dissenter. At least that opinion is scarcely inescapable as one plows through thousands of tracts and periodical pieces—sulphurous, incomprehensible, reasonable, or noble, but invariably controversial. No one can read even a fraction of this literature without appreciating more clearly the English spirit. No one can read it without appreciating that, in certain respects, Dissent at once extended and contradicted the English Reformation. It attempted to translate into reality the ideal of reform and the right of private judgment; it repudiated the idea of a state church. More than this, it taught that heaven's laws "are over all, and all must honor them," that heaven's sanctities, "which are not of today nor yesterday" may not be overridden by positive law.

The English Reformation may be defined as a movement to set up a reformed Catholic Church, to strengthen spiritually an institution that counteracted anarchic tendencies in society. In after years Dissent stressed the reform, and Anglicanism, more than ever, the institutional bulwark against anarchy. In rejecting abuses, Dissenters, unfortunately for their own tradition, rejected many noble doctrines of which the abuses were but the ignoble offshoots. As a partial consequence, Dis-

persecution, see the present writer's "Catholics and the Courts in England since the Protestant Revolt" *Fordham Law Review*, IX (1940), 38-64. Jews, probably because of their numerical insignificance, suffered little overt persecution after their readmission and, indeed, gained concessions denied some Christians; nonetheless, the courts withheld from them many privileges of citizenship. The extravagant actions and utterances of extremists among the Protestant Dissenters jeopardized the hopes and plans of Presbyterians, Baptists, and Independents, by giving the opponents of relief an easy opportunity to emphasize that liberty always means license.

sent has no literary, no philosophical, no devotional, no architectural monuments comparable to those of Episcopacy. Indeed, in all these respects, it has often been small and dingy. Dissenting tracts and sermons were frequently clouds without water, epithet without passion or purpose, a bill of particulars and not a philosophy of universals. Lacking order, serenity, or logic, they sometimes pushed doctrines with such intensity and to such extremes as to achieve an effect opposite to their purpose. Yet, when one separates the wheat from the chaff—and what a mountain of chaff there is—he finds kernels so prolific that they seem less to have altered than to have shaped modern English history. The men, the incidents have passed; the problems and the essential spirit, shorn of fanaticism, refined by history, stand clear.

The Restoration identified subject and worshipper, and sought by canon and by statute to prevent England from becoming a congeries of sects. The attendant Erastianism formulated a religious, political, and social monopoly which Dissenters denounced, less as an aggression of the state than as the failure of the church. They grimly attacked those "sapient sutlers of the Lord" who, in blithely subordinating the church to the state, betrayed the greater cause by making that cause exalt themselves. For their part, they realized that Christianity was not the Church of England but a gospel, a dogma, a belief about God, the world, and man. Ofttimes, it is true, they professed to go back to the primitive church, but for all their appeal to history they lacked a historic sense. They were too immersed in their problems to use history as more than a verbal convention, and their predicament placed them in a spot too shifting for an impressive structure of logic, tradition, and scholarship. Yet, in reality, they were seeking central affirmations in Christian faith to regenerate society along the lines they idealized; they were attempting to escape the cul-de-sac implicit in identifying "the cause of moral values with that of a state."

Consequently, the eternal struggle between Dissent and those who would make religious ceremonies a requisite for civil office made religion so great a reality to the average Englishman that he never considered it exclusively as a formal revelation or an external institution. In a country without a state church, in a day when inflation is the bogy, when a quack psychologist is our master of casuistry, and when matters of conscience often excite no more than a smile or a sneer, it is difficult, even impossible, to appreciate the full implications of the

problems discussed here. When men debated the status of religious minorities, they by no means confined themselves to the public or the expedient aspect of the question, they sought, also, to expose or defend the theological motivation of a particular group. A Presbyterian was a menace, not merely because he was basically a republican, but because his essential theological position must ultimately destroy the society they knew.[12]

To see this situation at its fullest, one must read the fugitive literature as well as the public law. Then he will come laboriously to understand how shallow are many generalizations on the period here discussed. For instance, he will entirely reject Laski's description of the years from Locke to Bentham as "an age of methods rather than of principles," an "era of stagnation" in political thought. To be sure, if by political thought one means conscious formulation of ideal aims in the grand manner, the character applies; but not if one includes ways of behaving and the birth of values which are the sand and cement of utopias. Political thought is not less a way of life, an improvisation, than a program; and if ever the rivers of political theory ran bank-full, it was in this vital era when men were debating their own and their country's future with all the resources they could command, and under conditions which often appeared a race between toleration and catastrophe.

12. To what extent this was true is clearly seen in Edward Chamberlayne *(Angliae Notitia,* pp. 255 ff.) who, in listing the Dissenters as of five sorts—Libertines, Papists, Anabaptists, Independents, and Presbyterians, correlated the private aberration and public menace of each. Yet he confessed "that in all these sects there are some good moral men, nay, some of them zealous towards God. . . . Neither are they all equally blameable in all respects. The Presbyterians come nearest to the Church; the Quakers are the most peaceable; the Papists are the most mannerly, and the like. . . ."

ON PLENITUDE AND PRAISE

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AN IRONICAL REFLECTION on contemporary society is that its students of human relations have observed so broadly and discussed so acutely the connection between frustration and aggression while largely neglecting the at least equally important connection between fulfillment and generosity. Long before psychology tried to become a laboratory science, self-created in the image of physics, Descartes had accorded an equal importance to the two relationships. In his treatise on the passions of the soul, he stated that, while repeated pleasure generates joy and love for its cause, repeated pain generates depression and hatred towards its cause. Each of those two fundamental Cartesian propositions has a positive value for contemporary students of man. And each of them undoubtedly requires modification in the light of psychologic research and systematic field observations of group behavior. As a matter of fact, however, the contemporary science of social relations, if such it may be called, has lost the psychologic balance of Cartesian theory. Only the relationship between pain and hatred, translated into behavioral terms as the frustration-aggression hypothesis, has been shown on an empirical basis to have varied, but universal, consequences for the systematic interpretation of personal conduct and inter-group action.

Behavioristic psychologists do state that such attitudes as a young child's love toward its mother are consequences of the individual's having associated her appearance with feelings of satisfaction. The same psychologists, engrossed as they are with the study of infantile behavior, abnormal behavior, and animal behavior, have but little conception of the broad ramifications of the connection between personal fulfillment and such phenomena as service, co-operation, and generosity. The naturalistic psychologist characteristically scales down his subject matter to the level of his own methodology. His conception of the total range of human fulfillments is very partial and, hence, his knowledge of the consequences of personal plenitude is also partial. Behaviorism stresses, in its theory of human satisfaction, the reduction of the so-called segmental tensions through the agency of objects whose

use is defined with sole reference to them. It de-emphasizes the mutual interaction of tension systems within the matrix of personality, not to mention their mutual representatives within creative experience. Agencies of fulfillment, like aesthetic themes, logical structures, and, in general, all the more many-sided constellations of energy which evoke, and sometimes satisfy, the higher needs of man, are scrupulously reduced to other terms when they cannot be overlooked entirely.

Perhaps our psychological and social theories are more one-sided than was the Cartesian because the typical life experience in contemporary Western civilization includes only an impoverished representation of the total range of possible fulfillments. Lost in an environment of narrowly utile artifacts, and of pseudo-aesthetic objects which appeal to the segmental tensions only, the typical machine-age intellectual, in his reflections on human behavior, succeeds in rationalizing only his own tension, and hence explains little or nothing in its true context. Can the contemporary over-emphasis on frustration-aggression be regarded as one sign that the unhappy types of personal orientation are, in this age, much more common than are the joyful types? Or is it merely a consequence of the fact that today, as ever, unhappy persons make by far the loudest demands upon the attention of social thinkers? Perhaps both factors play a part. In a non-aristocratic epoch, the concept of "noblesse oblige" is largely forgotten. In a non-ecclesiastical epoch, the conviction that "the first should be the servants of all" is not widely appreciated. Such principles, nevertheless, may point toward some highly general factors in human behavior which do survive. Unhappy persons, always numerous, are most frequent in epochs of extreme transition. In man, moral confusion is tantamount to unhappiness.

Fear and guilt feelings are accorded today great importance even as motivators of religious behavior. Factors like admiration and gratitude receive only a cursory glance. That the core factor in at least some religious behavior, once the elements of childish magic have been outgrown, is a veritable celebration of existence is a thesis which could be defended, especially through reference to the lives of the mystics, which may be the chief sources of creative advance in the field of religion. Such a thesis, to be sure, would strike a discordant note in the symphony of contemporary psychological theorizing. At any rate,

it was the present writer's reflections upon mysticism which led to the idea that the logic of the frustration-aggression hypothesis, so painstakingly worked out by Dollard, Sears, and their co-workers, is paralleled to a certain extent by the logic of the relationships between fulfillment and generosity. If a large proportion of destructive behavior can be interpreted usefully within the schema of socially channeled frustration-aggression, an equally important fraction of serviceable behavior can be interpreted within the schema of fulfillment-generosity. Reflection and investigation along these lines might throw new light upon some features of the frustration-aggression hypothesis itself, as well as leading to entirely unexplored problem areas in the theory of human conduct.

In the first place, the frustration-aggression sequence signalizes only one type of crisis situation. Let us call these crises which are signalized by the threat-escape sequence or by the frustration-aggression sequence "crisis of opposition." In other words, let us assume that those investigators who have developed the frustration-aggression hypothesis as a theory of human motivation were concerned only with one type of crisis of opposition. Let us then note that there are many altogether different types of human crisis. Among the other types, one of the most frequent is the crisis of confusion. Most of the so-called laboratory neuroses which have been produced in sub-human organisms by confronting them with discrimination problems which exceed their sensory and intellectual capacities are responses to what might be called crises of confusion. The human being who cannot with confidence and consistency discriminate between helpful and inimical social forces is operating under similar conditions and may develop similar overgeneralized emergency responses. There are also crises of deprivation in which there is no ambiguity of stimuli and in which no specific agent frustrates personal striving, but which arise because anticipated goal-objects fail to appear. In other words, not only are there situations in which values are ambiguous, and situations in which value-seeking is obstructed, but there are also situations which are depressingly devoid of value-objects. A crisis of desolation arises whenever all the anticipated goal-objects are available but nevertheless fail to arouse any enthusiasm. Some persons who have become very adept in achieving all their clearly defined goals nevertheless feel very badly about the

world and about themselves. A sense of meaninglessness supervenes despite enhanced efficiency. A judgment of feeling contradicts the cognitive judgment of success. The whole situation threatens to collapse. The person feels desolate because what he has taken to be standards of success fail to conform with his own deeper, undefined nature. He does not know what would be a full value for him, but only knows that the things he had learned to anticipate as such have not proved adequate. His fulfillment has not been integral and hence, in a deeper sense, is a frustration.

Are there also crises of plenitude? Are there (in a phenomenological sense) situations which fairly explode under the pressure of affirmative feeling as well as those which seems to collapse through affective desolation? Are there situations which satisfy the striving being beyond all its expectations, and in which behavior representing affirmation in excess typically occurs? Such, at any rate, would be the situations to which a fulfillment-generosity hypothesis would be most obviously applicable. When reality provides something superior in quantity, or more especially in quality, to what the self had wished or could even imagine, the self experience a crisis of plenitude.

Fulfillment no more invariably promotes generosity than does frustration invariably motivate aggression. The factor of recognition (correct or mistaken) of the agent which has caused frustration or fulfillment may be decisive in determining whether aggression or generosity shall occur. Sometimes fulfillment causes only an increase in self-love, just as sometimes frustration only promotes guilt feelings. There are (logically and illogically) transferred or generalized generosities, just as there are (logically and illogically) transferred or generalized attitudes of hatred. It may be that, when frustration by a particular agent becomes familiar, and is even anticipated in advance of the event, the agent will no longer arouse hatred. It may also be that, when specific satisfaction by virtue of a particular agent becomes habitual, the agent will no longer evoke affirmative feeling. Those agents which bestow value which exceeds expectations, and especially those which yield enjoyments of new types or rare qualities, will most surely signalize the crises of plenitude whose outcome is frequently generosity even unto excess. Situations in which gratitude is learned must also teach generosity.

Fulfillment-generosity is probably a more highly intellectualized, or symbolically mediated, behavior sequence than is the frustration aggression sequence. The parallels between animal and human behavior are less extensive in regard to fulfillment-generosity. Biting the hand that feeds one may be less common than is praising the very causes of cultural desolation and despair, because a larger amount of symbolical mediation permits a greater variability of response and, hence, a wider margin of error. At any rate, praise is just as certainly a special form of affirmation as blame is a special form of rejection. Also, just as aggression has many forms, depending upon the calculation of risks and the understanding of what means would be effective, so, too, generosity has many forms, depending upon more and less mature ideas of helpfulness. The generous parent need not "coddle" his child but, on the contrary, may wish him to acquire frustration-tolerance and a balanced view of the duties and risks, along with the privileges and rewards of human life. Incidentally, development of generalized attitudes of generosity is absolutely impossible in a person having low frustration-tolerance. Existence as a whole could be delightful only to one who has learned how to assert himself without loss of capacity for gratitude, to resist some appeals without loss of capacity for admiration, and to exploit instrumental knowledge without loss of capacity for the enjoyment of passive contemplation. Those who cannot tolerate struggle, like those who are set continually in an implicit attitude of struggle, could scarcely celebrate existence through serving others who are questing towards the achievement of their own general delight in being. The deeply sophisticated person knows that this existence is more like a desert which gives rise to, and destroys, various oases than it is like a single lush oasis, and he celebrates this fact, too, because he is acquainted with the emotionally stultifying complacency and the bestial insensitivity of the oasis-type of man who either, like the child, does not recognize the desert, or else, like the fool who would dominate the unconditioned reality because it has sometimes frustrated him, hates the desert. The celebrant of existence is, and this with only seeming irony, a desert-type of man and not an oasis-type man.

This has anticipated many points. The problem of how attitudes are generalized becomes insoluble if approached only in terms of a principle of association by contiguity, or of a logically parallel prin-

ciple of conditioning. If association by similarity be admitted as an explanatory principle, or, in other words, if we admit the possibility of insight concerning functional equivalences, then we can see how a generalized attitude of generosity may emerge from the crises of plenitude. The one who can celebrate existence is generous towards his fellow men, but not necessarily because all of them have been serviceable to him. Between mystic ecstasy and social concern there is frequently a causal relation. The mystic learns to delight in and serve his fellow men as images of God, or as objects of divine love. Men become objects of his generosity because they are thought to resemble the source of plenitude, or else because serving them is thought to be the available way of praising it. In these cases of mysticism which results in compassion, there is a tension which must be released, and the mystic feels blessed in suffering from this necessity rather than feeling personally meritorious in acting it out.

The most adequate way of expressing the plenitude of mystic experience, of celebrating that which has bestowed upon the mystic such experience, frequently is felt by mystics to be the preparation of other persons to experience in themselves the bestowing source. A mystic may realize, if he is also, like most mystics, not without some pragmatic traits, that this preparation of others usually must be indirect, at least in its early stages. The conditions of psychologic health must be established, and some of these are the same as the conditions of physical health. Afterwards, plenitude may become the proximate aim. The mystic celebrates existence by serving persons because existence seems to be personal, or to express the personal, and to express that which tends to produce personality on ever higher levels. The mystic loves men as images of God, and because they seem to be objects of God's productive concern. Serving men seems equivalent to serving God; persons seem to resemble, in different degrees, the source of plenitude. Whether the psychologic identifications which the mystic tends to make are metaphysically valid is a question which is not our chief concern here, but some consideration of this issue will be given below. We will conclude that the total structure of things to which the mystic responds does express something which is not altogether different in kind from what is subsumed under the category of personality. We will call it, quite conventionally, the supra-personal or God.

First, however, there are some complications on the purely psychologic level which should be considered. Too often, perhaps, such sequences as frustration-aggression and fulfillment-generosity have been described with reference only to the operation of single motives, rather than with reference to the unity of the organism. Anything which impedes activity is frustrating, and anything which supports it and augments it fulfills the nature of the person. Motivation is tendency to act, and a unified, mutually supporting release of the various tensions is the fullest activity of the total organism. A very meaningful world is one which favors integrated activity, and the world seems less meaningful to the person if its stimuli fail to support a mutually stimulating release of the urges. The crises of confusion, of deprivation, of opposition, and of desolation arise in types of situation which lower, or threaten to lower, the general level of personal activity. The crises of plenitude arise in situations which raise this level to new heights, or at least to momentarily unexpected heights. Thus understood, the relationship between a meaningful world and fulfillment-generosity should be obvious. It must be stressed, however, that a world which promotes intricate personal activity of a narrowly intellectual type, involving symbolic functions which have only superficial consequences for feeling and for motor activity, is not the most satisfying sort of world. Only when the total system of affective and motor capacities reverbrates with, and in turn enriches, the more exclusively associative functions is the activity level at its highest. An object whose influence is momentarily very elating would fail to promote more than a momentary and superficial generosity if the tensions then released had neither symbolic nor instrumental relevance to other tensions and other types of objects.

The objects whose services most fulfill the nature of the person, and most promote personal generosity, are those whose effects functionally unify the various motivational systems. It seems to this writer that great works of art, great teachers, great lovers of persons, great lovers of nature, and nature itself, when appreciated in some of its richness of interlocked forms and of interwoven sequences, and especially with reference to its focussing of effects through the evolution of symbolic systems, are notable examples of such objects. They promote crises of plenitude through their mimesis-evoking values, rather than exclu-

sively in terms of their instrumental functions, or even of their values as goal objects for particular motives. They are ego-transforming, satisfying as much by suggesting new desires as by fulfilling old ones. The influence of such objects, of course, cannot be attributed exclusively to the prior capacities of the self. Hence the delight they give does not promote mere self-love. Furthermore, it is easiest, and also most logical, to attribute independent personality to patterned influences which further personalize the self by making its world more meaningful and raising its activity level. That which exceeds my imagination in the intricacy of its productivity is more personal than I am, and I am most sure of this at those moments when I feel its productivity working in me, giving me beauty which I could not have constructed, purpose which corrects the always provincial intentions of my unaided ego, purpose which, by liberating me from my old self, renews me on a higher activity level.[1]

Is it true that, since the lover of nature, even with respect to its immediate patterns, but more especially with respect to the logical beauty of its broader scope and recondite order, attains fulfillment similar to that which the lover of persons achieves, this nature is, or that it expresses, personality? The matrix from which persons develop, is nature also in itself akin to the personal? As indicated above, such a question is not the chief concern of the present discussion, which is concerned more with describing, than with metaphysically justifying, the affirmative orientations. It may be said parenthetically, however, that the order of nature as we know it is the antithesis of a chance order. True, the events of the greatest integrated complexity in nature, like the events of the greatest integrated complexity in a chance order of events, are the rarest events. In the natural order, as in a chance order, there is a strictly negative correlation between the degrees of intricacy of patterns and their degrees of frequency of occurrence. Thus far, the natural order would seem to resemble a chance order. The differences between the two, however, become overwhelmingly significant, just be-

1. The epistemological transcendence of the object or, in other words, its very objectivity is demonstrated by the self transcendence which the person achieves through it. Other signs of transcendence, like shock and strangeness, may be interpreted as indicating that the person is finite, but not as indicating what his matrix is, excepting that it is other than the person. The latter signs are, as it were, exclamations or deficient communications of the nature of things.

cause of the existence of the similarity which we have noted. The events in a chance order are mutually independent. The events in the natural order are both causally and symbolically interrelated. Thus we see that the pattern of chance is like an inverse reflection of the pattern of nature. A chance order is the most scrupulously anti-natural of human constructs, because the events in a chance sequence, for example, the different casts in a series of throws of the dice, are kept mutually independent to the greatest possible degree. Events in nature at large are mutually dependent in so great a degree that the very existence of many, if not all, of them presupposes their belonging to specific patterns which, in turn, could exist only within more comprehensive matrices.

On each successively higher evolutionary level in nature, the individuals evince successively greater degrees of co-instrumentality and co-symbolic character, among the parts of each, as well as evincing successively increasing degrees of scope of focus for the influences in their environments. Lower levels are the necessary conditions for higher levels, and higher levels symbolically unify the trends of influence from different lower levels, focussing more and more of the whole, in a more and more proportionate manner. The logical beauty of the total system deviates from that of the finest constructs on the highest level in the same direction in which the highest focus which is contained within nature deviates from the lowest focus which nature produces. The highest locally achieved focus is on the level of the personal. The total system is most accurately characterized as being supra-personal. Nature must be an expression of, if not the very visage of, the supra-personal. Nature, when focussed and illumined in a synoptic intuition, is recognized by the mystic to be a perfect order, supervening upon, and infusing with its own character, the clash of forces, the estrangement mutual of local aims, and the wealth of diverse action-styles. The working of omnipotence is sensed in the tragedies of weakness, through illusion omniscience is glimpsed, and the valid purpose is felt rising through the vanities of provincial self-assertion. Who attains to this correction celebrates existence.

The most generous persons, it seems to me, must be those who can feel that the new is eternal, and that the vast is here, because each particular event is felt by them to be symbolical of the total system.

Such persons, it seems to me, must be the clearest foci of the general character of that system. They must be the ones who have lived through crises of plenitude which corrected them without making them feel ashamed because these crises were also the "Open sesame!" to new delight. The same crises must have made them more compassionate, without making them arrogant, because they have felt such compassion not as a construct of their own egos, but as an expression of that "go of things" to which they were most fully awakened through those crises. These must be the persons who celebrate existence in the very act of suffering with the most blighted mortals, and in admiring after its kind the design of even the least evolved levels of action. These must be the ones who have broken through conventions, not, as it were, "downward" into regressive fantasy and spasmodic action, but rather, as it were, "upward" into prophetic vision and creative action. Such persons are the natural leaders of all who are deprived and of all who are rebellious, because the merely smug, the merely conventional, cannot be led. But rebellion, when it lacks such leaders, will end only in anarchy or in tyranny. Those who are only in want, like those who are moved by generalized attitudes of aggression, provide much of the energy for social transitions, but must either fail to channelize it, or else must channelize it regressively, because their perspectives are narrow. They need help from the generous ones, the corrected ones, from those whose cosmic fortunes constitutes the true imperative to service when they are stirred to action by the contrasting tensions of a world of distressed souls.

Must the development of such persons be left, humanly speaking, to the realm of chance? It would seem not. Everything which promotes personal security, other things being equal, should promote this development. But economic security could be, at most, a necessary condition and never the sufficient cause. The enjoyment of existence is nourished upon the widest experience. Theoretical considerations could never be sufficient. There must be participation. Our education, even our religious education, consists too much in the learning of theories about things. Plenitude must involve the appreciation of patterns, since facts in isolation scarcely have a meaning. Our education is too narrowly factual to encourage the frequent development of superior men.

Patterns themselves must be comprehended with reference to their

development. Things are alien and valueless, and they are taken for granted smugly, if the student fails to appreciate the intelligence and the suffering, the conflict and the toil, involved in their production. Our education neglects to stress the productive process sufficiently. There is a production on the most local level of experience. There is a production on the cosmological level, and on all the intermediate levels. But he who merely watches the toiler or artist does not directly know the cost of production. There must not only be direct intuition of forms, as well as theories about forms, there must also be participation in production, as well as information about production.

The education in love depends upon the recognition of more and more recondite forms of interdependence, and more and more recondite forms of resemblance. The elementary school student may be taught much of biological interdependence, economic interdependence. The most abstruse theories of physical structure, ranging from the atomic to the astronomical levels, are exhibitions of dynamic interdependence. Similarly, all social theory, and all theory of aesthetics, from the most elementary to the most advanced levels, is a study in resemblances, in symbolic correspondence between person and person, group and group, man and animal and plant, physical system and biological system, total system and local system. Teaching the attitude of love necessarily involves teaching ourselves and our students to recognize mutual dependence and mutual representation, in all the realms of action and experience. Religious education teaches us to recognize that which sustains all the other forms and which resembles us, not as we have made ourselves, nor even as we have imagined ourselves, but which resembles us with the resemblance of the ultimate nature to the questing nature. This is the correction which all life needs: to recognize this relationship, while the uncelebrated glory celebrates through us our own inglorious vanities.

Of course, much adult education must consist in overcoming the consequences of the propaganda in falsehood that all of us have suffered. Hence, a negative motivation may be for many modern men a chief drive toward illumination. We refer to the desire to abandon those artifacts which, in providing segmental satisfactions, have left the soul desolate, and the desire to deny loyalty to institutions which, by their methods of serving the alleged ideal, have tended to refute it. The

facilely utile and the politically expedient, perhaps, must be denied for a season by whosoever desires to discover their actual, subordinate value.

The lost person needs to escape from a negative culture only far enough barely to feel the reality of his own earthly individuality, barely to sense the plenum of living orders, barely to admire the mountains and the stars, barely to venture the unpolitical expression, barely to value the non-utile arts, barely to smile at the logically right history of human errors which have led to the annihilation of social orders. Nothing radical is required of the oasis dweller. Let him approach sufficiently near the boundary to feel, however dimly, the mysterious life of the desert. The first step toward plenitude is the least act of self-liberation from total involvement in a system of artifacts and illusions which calls itself Reality or the World.[2]

It is certain that our vanities, unless corrected by some dawning from without, could in the end render us totally unrepresentative, that is, could change us into images of ourselves, and of nothing beyond ourselves. In a word, the ego-purposive orientation could destroy a person or a civilization. The task of education is to enable the person to distinguish between that which he can do and that which may be done through him; that which he creates and that which is created through him. Unless the person appreciates that in human culture which is superior to him, he will be anti-social. General education should enable the person to distinguish between the great and the mediocre in all the chief areas of human activity, including the areas in which the person knows that he is mediocre. This presupposes his learning something of the aims, conditions, and operational methods of the various areas of human activity. Similarly, the person must learn to appreciate that which is beyond the scope of human culture, its activity being continued and variously focussed within human culture. Education should enable the person to appreciate that whose operational field is nature in the broadest sense, including within itself the

2. Artifacts, whether they be instruments or instrumental ideas, are real enough. The illusion is that their meaning is to be stated by referring one of these artifacts to another of them, or to their total system. Adaptive ideas, and their extension in the form of objective instruments, presuppose a need for expression and something to express. The compounding of means to means to means, of instrumentalities within and beyond other instrumentalities, will never account for expression and ordered motion as facts.

various realms of artifact. Such appreciation is the necessary cause of plenitude and praise.[3]

The chief obstacles to the learning of such appreciation would seem to be the error of mistaking some part for the whole, and the error of substituting abstract statements about actualities for personal experience of them. Selective attention and instrumental abstraction enlarge the human perspective without distorting it, only when they are balanced by synoptic reconstruction and self-forgetful contemplation. Since our initial focus is both limited and distorted, we must, as it were, go seeking nature, and we must not expect that nature will come seeking us. If we picture the world in our own image, or in the image of our own artifacts, nature must reflect back to us only the moral indifference of the ego-purposive animal. This process is the psychological basis of all forms of naturalistic philosophy whatsoever, and is the basis of secularism.

If we let our image of man be re-created in the light of all that he can appreciate and, as it were, reverberate to, in both the local and the remote, both the surface and the recondite unities of nature, then we will admit that the areas of insensitivity and indifference exist wholly within ourselves in so far as we have failed to appreciate and, hence, in our every deed to celebrate, the creative One, through the expression and sharing by each person of his own unique awareness of it. But only when he who has sought nature and what it expresses is most alive, may he know this with any immediacy of conviction. Man's most comprehensive certainties, however well founded in theory, are psychologically dubious to him except in his moments of synoptic intuition. Most of human life is lived and, perhaps, always will be lived, in a very mixed and fluctuating light within which the brutal and the comic seem to vie for supremacy, but within which the once intuited truth is seldom forgotten altogether. The well nurtured and well educated individual is able to operate within a context of brutality and farce, but he is not able to become utterly fascinated by, and re-

3. The sequences of existence must be related to the pathos of existence. Contents of experience must be related to the yearning of the whole and to the cause of quality as well as of change. Feeling and its expression, utterance and the feelings it induces, are the categories which, together with the category of degrees of expression and of readiness for response, alone will account for not only the sequence of things, but also for conflict and, hence, duration and for emergence which is coherent with system.

duced to, terms which describe them and still maintain either moral autonomy or intellectual integrity. In giving allegiance to moral autonomy and intellectual integrity, the naturalistic thinker confesses that his emotional allegiance lies elsewhere than his theoretical constructs seem to indicate. Philosophy must show that such splitting of personality is an accompaniment of metaphysical error which follows from identifying the whole with the part, or the activity with its name, and should do so before any particular form of naturalism has gone to its logical limit, that is, has thrown off the liberal mask and has accepted the evil mystique of ego-worship or of group-worship, becoming a totalitarian naturalism. Philosophy can perform this saving, critical role, but only if its exponents have attained unto a higher unity and have discovered the secret of plenitude and praise, a secret which is illumined, not through analytic methods but only, as we have tried to show, through the growth of integral persons, who, as the most proportionate foci of nature, intuit most clearly that spirit which nature expresses. Upon the work and the word of mystic persons all wisdom is founded. Systematic philosophy is an intellectual superstructure, and critical philosophy is an unmasking of error. The foundations of the true system depend upon a sharing of attitudes, since the finite person only knows the infinite through the process of sharing in some degree the attitude of the supra-personal or the infinite.

WOLFSON'S REVALUATION OF PHILO:* A REVIEW ARTICLE

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HOW MUCH INTEREST has been shown in the works of Philo of Alexandria by theologians and historians of philosophy and religion during the past century can be seen from a glance at the *Bibliography of Philo,* published by H. L. Goodhart and E. R. Goodenough in 1938. Even in the single decade preceding the completion of this Bibliography there appeared more than forty books and monographs on Philo.[1]

Among these and still more recent works there are several excellent presentations of Philo's philosophy as a whole; several interesting studies of Philo's personality, religious spirit, literary traits, and his relation to Judaism and to Greek culture; several useful monographs on the influence upon him of various schools of philosophy; and several suggestive treatments of the mystical elements in his writing. But to a student of Hellenistic Judaism and Hellenistic-Roman culture who, like the reviewer, has been convinced through a close study of Philo that the Alexandrian exegete was an original and systematic philosopher of considerably more importance than even such intelligent and learned critics as Zeller and Bréhier have recognized him to be, it has long seemed desirable that some scholar, fully equipped to deal with the historical and technical problems involved in the disentangling of elements from Hellenistic pagan, Hellenistic Jewish, and Palestinian Jewish tradition which are sometimes imperceptibly woven together in Philo's elaborate homilies, should undertake the laborious task of placing him in correct perspective in the history of Western thought.

This desideratum has now become an accomplished task in the two impressive volumes published by Professor H. A. Wolfson, of Harvard. He has given us an analysis, partly documented, partly based on ingenious reconstruction, of the chief theological and ethical teachings

* *Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity and Islam.* By HARRY AUSTRYN WOLFSON. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1947. Vol. I, xvi, 462 pp. Vol. II, xiv, 531 pp. $10.00.

1. Ralph Marcus, "Recent Literature on Philo," *Jewish Studies in Memory of George A. Kohut* (New York, 1935), pp. 463-91.

of Philo, and in this manner has clarified the relation of Philo to his predecessors, contemporaries, and successors, as he had earlier clarified the position of Spinoza in the history of Western philosophy.

Since Wolfson's study of Philo is only one unit in the series he has planned to reveal the "structure and growth of philosophic systems from Plato to Spinoza," one might reasonably have expected his exposition to fall short in some respects of those published by more specialized Philonists. But not only does it not fall short, it actually surpasses the studies of earlier scholars in breadth and depth.

In the first volume of his *Study of History,* Arnold Toynbee alludes rather regretfully to the effect of modern industrial methods of mass production on contemporary scholarship, namely to the replacement of the individual achievements of a Mommsen or a Ranke by the collaborative productions of specialists. Fortunately Toynbee himself is an exception to his own sociological rule, as Wolfson too will be when he has completed his monumental series. *Philo,* being organized along the same lines as the other volumes of the series, is based on what Wolfson calls "the hypothetico-deductive method," that is, on the reconstruction of the "latent processes" of thought employed by various philosophers. This particular work attempts to show that the whole of medieval philosophy (i.e., of the period between Philo and Spinoza), including Christian philosophy in Latin, Moslem philosophy in Arabic, and Jewish philosophy in Arabic and Hebrew, is a common philosophy and is essentially a revision of Greek philosophy, chiefly Platonic, secondarily Aristotelian and Stoic, to the extent that medieval thinkers found it necessary to harmonize Greek philosophy with the revelation found in Scripture (whether in the Old Testament, the New Testament, or the Qur'ān). Thus barely summarized, Wolfson's thesis is not startlingly new. What *is* startlingly new is his detailed and convincing demonstration, point by point, doctrine by doctrine, that the three medieval traditions are so derived and so formulated.

Even more startling is Wolfson's contention that "Philo is the direct or indirect source of this type of philosophy, which continues uninterruptedly in its main assertions for well-nigh seventeen centuries, when at last it is openly challenged by Spinoza" (II, 445-57).

From these remarks it will at once be apparent to the reader that Wolfson's *Philo* requires two different kinds of review, one by a Philonist, and one by an historian of Western philosophy. The present

reviewer will undertake only the first kind, and will therefore attempt to appraise the book only in so far as it studies Philo in relation to his predecessors and contemporaries. The reviewer will not discuss Wolfson's arguments for considering Philo as the chief founder of medieval philosophy, but he cannot resist the inclination to comment briefly on some of the recently published criticisms of this particular thesis. One competent and fair-minded scholar[2] complains that "Wolfson to me clearly implies what the failure to mention Jesus in the Index suggests, that the career of Jesus was not a noteworthy formative factor in the thought of the next seventeen centuries." This complaint arises from a misunderstanding of Wolfson's purpose. The omission of any reference to Jesus in *Philo* does not in the least indicate that Wolfson ignores Jesus' influence on later thought. It merely indicates that, in Wolfson's opinion (with which all historians of philosophy would probably concur), Jesus' teaching has never been a part of the formal philosophical systems which are the subject of his inquiry.

So soon as we have read a little of Wolfson's *Philo,* we are likely to feel surprise and curiosity that he applies the same method of interpretation that he earlier applied to Spinoza. There can hardly be two philosophers more markedly different in their manner of exposition. Philo is formally unsystematic, allusive, diffuse, capricious, and seemingly inconsistent. Spinoza is formally most systematic, precise, condensed, and consistent—in a word, used by himself, geometrical. Nevertheless, as it turns out, partly to our amazement, altogether to our admiration, Wolfson is successful in practicing the same kind of dialectical sleuthing on Philo's homiletical exposition that he practiced on the severe formulation of Spinoza. He has shown the same skill in supplying the missing bits of evidence and reconstructing the unapparent movements of thought, except that, in Philo's case, he has resorted largely to condensation of the argument, in Spinoza's, to amplification. This kind of sleuthing requires not only a fabulous knowledge of Greek, Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew philosophical terminology but also a discouraging amount of clarity and insight. That any scholar who has written about Philo's philosophical system has possessed these qualities as fully as Wolfson, the reviewer makes bold to doubt very seriously.

2. Floyd Filson, in *Jewish Quarterly Review,* XXXIX (1948-49), 97-102.

Of course, some scholars may, like Professor E. R. Goodenough[3] feel that

> this integration of Philo's thought, which is as near Philo's integration as I think we can ever get, Wolfson never discusses. The problem of Philo's relation to rabbinic Judaism and Greek philosophy is not to be solved by splitting his atoms but by understanding his integration, and the same may be said of understanding Philo himself. It gradually appears that Wolfson cares very little for Philo himself, only for Philo as the confluence of Judaism and Greek critical philosophy, and so as the keystone in his construction of the history of European philosophy.

It is quite true that there are important aspects of Philo's religious temperament which Wolfson neglects to discuss. That is because he is professedly dealing with Philo as one unit in his study of systematic philosophers. He therefore legitimately limits himself to considering "the systematic structure of his thought" (I, vi). As for Goodenough's statement that he has found "little of Philo himself or his spirit" in Wolfson's book, the reviewer can only invite the disappointed Philonist to console himself with the reflection that Philo qua systematic philosopher is fortunate in having found a more appreciative interpreter in Wolfson that he seems to have found in Goodenough.

In what follows the reviewer will attempt to summarize those findings of Wolfson that seems to him noteworthy for one of the following reasons (occasionally noting reservations or disagreement, though in remarkably few instances):

1. Because, for the first time, they reveal Philo's originality.

2. Because they resolve controversies about Philonic doctrine in a more definitive manner than earlier scholars have done.

3. Because they clarify more satisfactorily than earlier scholars have done what seems unclear or not wholly self-consistent in Philo's doctrine, and in his relation to predecessors and contemporaries. The reader who accepts the reviewer's high estimate of the validity of almost all of Wolfson's conclusions will probably remark to himself that our author has violated the biblical injunction (Lev. 19:9-10) to leave the corners of the field and the gleanings of the harvest for the poor and the stranger.

3. In *Journal of Biblical Literature*, LVII (1948), 87-110.

Chapter 1: *Hellenistic Judaism and Philo*

1.[4] Alexandrian Jews like Philo used the terminology of pagan religions without recognizing the truth of the pagan ideas expressed therein. In general, they approved of Greek religious philosophy as opposed to Greek popular religion, and saw in the Greek philosophers the spiritual kindred of the Jews, though, of course, they held that the whole truth was to be found only in biblical revelation.

2. When Philo speaks of the Lesser and Greater Mysteries, he means by the former the practice of virtue and the knowledge of God based on reason, and by the latter the idea of Grace and the knowledge of God given by revelation.

3. Philo's method in expounding the Law was to combine traditional Palestinian exegesis (Midrash) with philosophic-allegorical exegesis.

4. In this connection, Goodenough quotes Wolfson's statement (1, 95) that "Alexandrian Judaism at the time of Philo was a collateral branch of Pharisaic Judaism, which flourished in Palestine at that time, both of them having sprung from that pre-Maccabean Judaism which had been molded by the activities of the Scribes," and comments with asperity,

> The basic confusion of Wolfson's thought is well expressed here. Wolfson says not that Alexandrian and Pharisaic Judaism were collateral branches descended from a single Jewish original, to which no one could object, but that Alexandrian Judaism was a branch of Pharisaic Judaism because both had a common ancestor. This is to say that my cousin is my father because we have a common grandfather. The statement would be only a meaningless and amusing solecism such as we all make frequently if its confusion did not represent the confusion of the book as a whole.

There probably has never been a less confused writer than Wolfson, and Goodenough's characterization, to use his own words, would be only a "meaningless and amusing solecism," if his whole review did not reveal the same confusion about Wolfson's purpose and method. No one who reads the first chapter with moderate care can fail to see that Wolfson is perfectly clear about the fact that Alexandrian and Pharisaic Judaism "were collateral branches descended from a single Jewish original," as Goodenough correctly reformulates Wolfson's stylistically awkward statement.

4. The numbering of items is, of course, the reviewer's and not the author's.

Chapter II: *Handmaid of Scripture*

5. There is a fourfold relation between Philo's exegesis and rabbinic tradition: (1) some doctrines of both were derived from a common source; (2) some were independently developed in Alexandria and Palestine; (3) some were borrowed from Palestine by Alexandrian Jews; (4) some were borrowed from Alexandria by Palestinian Jews.

When Goodenough finds fault with Wolfson for assuming the Palestinian origin of some of Philo's interpretations of Scripture on the basis of rabbinic teachings a century or more later than Philo, he loses sight of the fact that there is a considerable difference between the use of Greek written philosophical sources and that of Jewish oral exegetical traditions. While it may be hazardous to assume the existence in the third or second century B.C. of a Greek philosophical doctrine attested not earlier than the second or third century A.D., it is perfectly legitimate to assume, on the basis of merely circumstantial evidence, that a particular rabbinic doctrine, attested not earlier than the second or third century A.D., was taught by the Scribes of the third or second century B.C. Such assumptions have been made and convincingly supported by indirect evidence in the writings of a good many modern students of rabbinic literature, such as L. Ginzberg, L. Finkelstein, V. Aptowitzer and G. Allon, to name but a few.

6. The external form given by Philo to his writings is a purely Jewish form of literary exposition. In partial confirmation of this thesis of Wolfson (not held by him alone, of course), the reviewer hopes to show in the near future that the book-divisions of Philo's *Quaestiones in Genesin et Exodum* coincide with the traditional Jewish Torah-sections or pericopes of the Pentateuch.

7. Philo's system is essentially a criticism of Stoicism and a revision of Platonism.

8. The subordination of philosophy to Scripture means to Philo the subordination of reason to faith.

Chapter III: *Scriptural Presuppositions*

9. Philo lays down eight principles as the essential doctrines of Scriptural religion: (1) the existence of God; (2) the unity of God; (3) divine providence; (4) the creation of the world; (5) the unity of the world; (6) the existence of incorporeal ideas; (7) the revelation of

the Law; (8) the eternity of the Law. All but the last two of these were also taught by Greek philosophers.

10. Those whom Philo called "champions of the mind" and "champions of the senses" were not Stoics and Epicureans, as earlier Philonists have supposed, but followers of the Protagorean doctrine that man is the measure of all things.

Chapter IV: *God, the World of Ideas, and the Logos*

11. Philo, in revising Plato's doctrine of ideas, introduces the idea of mind and the idea of soul, and identifies the Platonic ideas, in so far as they are causes and powers, with the powers of God. But sometimes Philo treats the ideas and powers as a totality or as the pattern and cause of the world as a whole. As such they are called "intelligible world" and Logos.

12. There are several stages in the development of Philo's Logos doctrine: (1) the Logos is the mind of God, identical with his essence; (2) the Logos enters upon a second stage of its existence, as an incorporeal mind created by God and existing outside of his essence; it contains the intelligible world and the myriads of ideas of which the latter consists; when this Logos is called "eternal," the term means "indestructible" rather than "uncreated"; (3) the third stage is that of the immanent Logos, which came into being after the creation of the world (this stage is discussed in the following chapter). Philo's use of Logos II makes it correspond very closely to the Stoic "mind of the world" in function. It is also sometimes synonymous with Wisdom *(sophia)* and with the Aristotelian *organon*. In contrast to Plato, who applies the terms "mother" and "nurse" to matter, Philo, influenced by Jewish tradition (Proverbs and Wisdom of Solomon), applies these terms to Wisdom.

Here we have one of the most important contributions to the interpretations of Philo's philosophy that the reviewer has ever come across. In his opinion, Wolfson has succeeded more fully than any other scholar in giving a clear and consistent outline of Philo's sometimes vague and seemingly inconsistent statements about the relation of the Logos to God and the world. On the basis of the evidence submitted by Wolfson, it appears that in *most* passages in Philo dealing with the Logos doctrine, whether explicitly or implicitly, the schematism described by Wolfson can really be found. But in disagreement with our

brilliant author, the reviewer stubbornly persists in believing that Philo's Logos doctrine is not *always* so self-consistent as Wolfson attempts to prove it to be. For example, in *De Congressu* 103-104, Philo says that the universe has nine parts (the seven planets, the sphere of the fixed stars, and the earth), while the only truly existing God is the tenth part. In *Quaestiones in Gen.*iv.110, Philo enumerates the same nine parts, but this time it is the "divine Logos" which, as the tenth part, governs and administers the universe. Unless we suppose that the Armenian translator of the passage (of which the Greek original is unfortunately lost) has inaccurately rendered it, we must recognize that, by the rules of formal logic, Philo has made the true God and the divine Logos identical, even though the former is described as existing alone, and the latter as governing.

13. In opposition to earlier scholars, Wolfson maintains that Philo had neither a logical nor an historical reason to look for intermediaries between God and the world. If Philo sometimes represents God as employing the Logos or his powers as intermediaries, this is because Philo, like the Rabbis, believed that God sometimes acted like a human being in order to set an example to men, and not because he was in need of agents or instruments.

Chapter v: *Creation and Structure of the World*

14. Philo modifies Plato's theory of creation by declaring that the matter in which the world was created and the matter from which the world was created were both themselves created by God.

Chapter vi: *The Immanent Logos, Laws of Nature, Miracles*

15. In opposition to the Stoics, who considered the "mind of the world" to be an immanent material principle, Philo insists that the immanent Logos (Logos III) is merely another stage of the incorporeal Logos created before the world by God, who is not immanent in the world. Nevertheless, Philo's immanent Logos performs about the same functions as does the Platonic-Stoic "world-soul."

The reader who compares what Wolfson says here (I, 328) with what he says in Chapter viii (I, 427), will probably find an inconsistency, which the author has acknowledegd in a letter to the reviewer. He has rephrased the latter passage as follows:

For though Philo's immanent Logos, which God implanted in the world at the

time of its creation to serve as its governing law, is not made of the mixed stuff of the Platonic universal soul but rather shares the pure immateriality of the ideas, still in function the universal soul and the immanent Logos are alike.

16. Philo conceived of three definite laws of nature, partly following Aristotle, partly the Stoics: (1) the law of opposites, including the concept of the Logos as Divider; (2) the law of the harmony of opposites; (3) the perpetuity of the species.

Here the reviewer wonders whether Wolfson might not have done well, in spite of his self-imposed limitation of the study to the more formal aspects of Philo's philosophy, to mention ancient Oriental ideas that may have influenced Philo's Logos doctrine, probably indirectly through the biblical concept of wisdom.[5]

17. In distinction from his Greek philosophical predecessors, Philo taught that God, the author of the laws of nature, reserves to himself the right to upset them by performing miracles. This doctrine, of course, became one of fundamental importance in medieval philosophy.

Chapter VII: *Souls, Angels, Immortality*

18. Philo apparently hesitates to say that celestial bodies have souls, but he is vague and inconsistent on this subject.

19. Angels are a special kind of immanent powers, acting as intermediaries between God and man, not because God needs them but as a boon to mankind.

20. Philo conceives immortality to be the eternal existence of a soul as a distinct entity, but still he speaks of the immortality of the universal idea of mind as imaged in the human species as a whole. One of the respects in which Philo differs from Plato is in holding that the soul of a wicked man may be utterly destroyed, while an act of divine providence may preserve the soul of the righteous man.

Chapter VIII: *Free Will*

21. While Plato taught that the relative strength of mind and body decides which is to rule the other, Philo holds that God helps the mind to conquer the body. For Plato there is no individual providence, while for Philo the mind is free to choose good or evil, being given this

5. See the reasonable discussions by Helmer Ringgren in his *Word and Wisdom* (Lund, 1947), esp. pp. 133-49.

freedom by God. The freedom of the human will is a counterpart of God's power to perform miracles.

22. God is not responsible for voluntary evil done by man. But in certain instances God may directly cause man to do evil involuntarily, for the purpose of administering justice in the universe.

23. The concept of divine grace helping virtuous men was evidently common among Philo's Jewish contemporaries in Palestine and in the Diaspora.

Chapter IX: *Knowledge and Prophecy*

24. Philo's psychological theories are essentially those of Plato, but his terminology is often Aristotelian and Stoic. He does not accept Plato's theory that the soul had knowledge before its union with the body, but holds that God is the direct cause of sensation and reason.

25. Philo identifies the highest kind of knowledge with prophecy, and substitutes the term "prophecy" for the Platonic term "recollection." In this connection Wolfson cites and correctly translates a passage from Philo's *Quaestiones in Gen.*iv.140 which was grossly mistranslated by Goodenough in his *By Light, Light* (p. 160),[6] and used by him to support his confused interpretation of Philo's attitude toward the Law.

26. The sources of prophecy are, according to Philo: (1) the divine spirit; (2) God himself or the voice of God; (3) angels. Philo also uses the term "divine spirit" in the double sense of (a) prophetic inspiration and (b) the rational soul.

27. The divine spirit is an incorporeal soul or a kind of angel created by God.

28. Scriptural prophecy through the divine spirit differs from the various kinds of inspiration known to the Greeks in that the former has an element of divine grace.

Here, again, the reviewer would have liked to see Wolfson depart from his formal and systematic analysis of philosophical sources to the extent of inquiring whether there was not a psychological-religious correspondence between Greek and Jewish ideas of divine inspiration that was closer than his analysis indicates.

6. As the reviewer pointed out in *American Journal of Philology*, LVII (1936), 203-5.

29. Philo agrees with the Palestinian Rabbis in holding that prophetic inspiration in biblical form ceased with Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi.

Chapter X: *Proofs of the Existence of God*

30. In opposition to the Stoics, Philo proves by the analogy of the human mind that God is not material and not immanent in the world.

Chapter XI: *The Unknowability of God and Divine Predicates*

31. Philo converted the biblical concept of God's unlikeness to any created being into the philosophical principle of the incorporeality and simplicity of God.

32. By the adjective *apoios,* applied to God, Philo means "without genus and species."

33. Against earlier scholars, including Eduard Norden, Wolfson argues, convincingly on the whole, that Philo was the first philosopher to demonstrate the unnameability and unknowability of God.

34. Philo reduces all the properties ascribed to God to the single property of acting, and teaches that the various divine predicates are not indications of multiplicity in God.

35. There is some ambiguity in Philo's views as to whether the essence of God's created powers can be fully known by man. The majority of passages indicate that he did not think they can be fully known, but he did believe that the virtuous man can increase his knowledge of the existence and essence of God.

Chapter XII: *Ethical Theory*

36. In criticism of the Greek philosophers, Philo seeks to show that only the Mosaic Law is "in accordance with nature" in the true sense of the term.

37. There are three new elements in Philo's use of the term "natural law": (1) that natural laws are those that existed before the Mosaic Law was revealed and were incorporated in it; (2) that they are also the laws observed by certain persons of the pre-Mosaic age; (3) that they were designed for men but modelled upon the laws made for nature. These three new elements were based upon Jewish tradition.

38. Philo also adds to the traditional Jewish classifications of the laws and commandments by developing the idea that the Mosaic

Law is the ideal law posited by Greek philosophers as man's guide to virtuous conduct.

In amplification of this theme, Wolfson establishes, more clearly than earlier scholars, in the reviewer's opinion, the various senses of such Philonic terms as "virtue" *(aretē)*, "piety" *(eusebeia)*, and "faith" *(pistis)*. To Philo, "faith" meant three things: (1) belief in the unity and providence of God; (2) belief in the truths revealed directly by God; (3) trust in God.

39. While Philo places the contemplative life above the practical, he asserts their equality in several passages where he presupposes that the practical life is lived in accordance with the Mosaic Law.

40. Philo believes that the majority of men need not extirpate their emotions but merely learn to control them.

41. The Mosaic Law, according to Philo, contained four kinds of virtues: (1) true beliefs; (2) virtuous emotions; (3) actions symbolizing beliefs; (4) actions symbolizing moral virtues.

Chapter XIII: *Political Theory*

42. Philo's reconstruction of the Mosaic constitution is in general agreement with that of the early Rabbis. In particular, he seems to regard the Synhedrion of his own time as a continuation of the Mosaic council of seventy elders.

43. Philo consistently stressed the superiority of kinship based on common belief to that based on common descent.

44. With the exception of certain laws regarding the king and slaves, Philo, like the Rabbis, took the biblical term "thy brother" to include proselytes. Moreover, the "spiritual proselytes" (Wolfson's term for the more conventional "semi-proselytes") of Philo are not only the Gentiles who observe the Mosaic Law, but also the Gentiles who by their own reason have arrived at a philosophical conception of God and practice a life of virtue.

45. Like the Palestinian Rabbis, Philo regarded the changes made in the Mosaic Law by interpretation, not as innovations, but rather as discoveries of the true meaning.

46. The term "democracy" is used by Philo, not in the sense of a particular form of government, but in that of a general principle according to which each man receives his due under any form of government, whether monarchic, aristocratic, or democratic.

47. In presenting the Jews as a nation transcending the limits of race and local citizenship, Philo formulated a new conception of nationality, based on religion and culture rather than on race, territory or form of government.

48. Philo believed that the Mosaic Law would be universally accepted in the Messianic age, and that the whole world would be a confederation of states, each following the principle of proportional equality or "democracy" (see No. 46 above) as it was taught in the Mosaic Law.

Chapter XIV: *What is New in Philo?*

49. Philo was the founder of that medieval philosophy common to Christians, Moslems, and Jews which was based on the following principles, first clearly formulated by Philo: (1) Scripture is the one infallible source of truth; (2) human reason also is a source of truth; (3) since God is the author of both revelation and reason, there can be no conflict between them: Scripture must be interpreted in the light of reason, and reason must be guided by Scripture; (4) Scripture teaches us to believe in the existence and unity (i.e., uniqueness and simplicity) of God, in the creation of the world, in divine providence, and in the divine origin of the rules of conduct.

50. Reason has led philosophers to discover some of the above-mentioned truths, but it has failed to prove the unity of God, the unknowability and indescribability of his essence, his power to change the laws of nature by performing miracles, individual providence and the freedom of the human will.

Conclusion: What is New in Wolfson's PHILO?

The fifty paragraphs enumerated above contain what the reviewer, on the basis of a long study of Philo and a careful reading of Wolfson's book, believes to be the most important of the new or improved interpretations of Philo's philosophical doctrines which are found in this book. The reviewer considers them in themselves a contribution to the subject greater than any made by the many excellent scholars who have written on Philo during the past. The reader should note, however, that this high tribute is paid to the book as a study of Philo's *philosophical doctrines.* Neither the author nor the reviewer claims that it is a study of all the aspects of Philo's life and teaching. But,

even with this limitation, Wolfson's study seems to the reviewer a more valuable contribution than even those books which have included less formal and systematic treatments of Philo's work. In fact, the limitation is an important, perhaps the most important, factor in making Wolfson's *Philo* the extraordinarily fine achievement which the reviewer believes it to be. The reason is that, while Philo has long been recognized to be a great religious spirit and the outstanding representative of Hellenistic Jewish theology, and even an important source of patristic and Neo-Platonic thought, he has not been adequately recognized as a philosopher in his own right. Whether he was really the founder of "medieval" philosophy, as Wolfson claims, is a problem with which the reviewer has not attempted to wrestle in this review, but it should at least be said by one who is a Philonist rather than an historian of medieval philosophy that no one has a right to dispute Wolfson's thesis who does not possess the same impressive and authoritative knowledge of medieval texts, the same powers of deduction and the same insight as the author.

To those who find pleasure, as do many poets in our industrial age, in watching the smooth functioning of a compact, powerful and intricate machine, the reviewer would recommend the even keener esthetic pleasure of watching the smooth functioning of a powerful and subtle mind that takes in the raw materials of philosophical doctrines with their outer wrappings of rhetoric, and "processes" them into beautifully simple and clear statements that can be arranged in logical order. This description will not suggest to anyone who appreciates the intellectual rigor of even mystical philosophies like those of Philo and Plotinus that either the interpreter of Philo or Philo himself is an unemotional rationalist. It will merely make clear, what seems not to be clear even to so perceptive a critic as T. S. Eliot, that Keats was not talking nonsense when he wrote

Beauty is truth, truth beauty.

Deliver Us From Evil: Studies on the Vedic Ideas of Salvation. By Sten Rodhe. (Publications by the Swedish Society for Missionary Research, No. 2) Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup; Copenhagen: Ejnar Munksgaard, 1946. 207 pp. Kr. 8:50.

In this carefully documented study, Dr. Sten Rodhe discusses the various kinds of evil recognized in Vedic literature and the nature of the deliverance which Vedic man sought from that evil. In so doing, he treats one of the most important motivations of Vedic religious practice. The extent to which Vedic man was concerned, one might almost say obsessed, with evil and the need to escape it, is roughly indicated by the special index of words with meanings that belong under these general heads. Approximately 130 words are listed, of which by far the greater number signify some form of evil, its perpetrators, and its effects. As the words themselves reveal, man experiences evil in many ways: premature death, old age, (re)birth, disease, want, etc. Its form of action upon human beings is oftenest conceived as "bond," "snare," "fetter," "grasping." It springs from the malevolent action of demons, sorcerers, human rivals, deities, and the unconscious wrong acts of the subject himself. Evil is such because it is contrary to Cosmic Order (*anṛta*), or hostile to the gods (*adeva*), or false (*asat, asatya*), or offends some specific vow or individual duty of god or man (*vrata*). The types of salvation are less numerous, though they range from salvation from enemy action or sonlessness or early death to avoidance of rebirth in the *saṃsāra* (the round of corporeal existence).

The literature surveyed by Dr. Rodhe consists of the Vedic Saṃhitās, the Brāhmaṇas, the Āraṇyakas, and the Upaniṣads. He does not endeavor to find a historical development of ideas of evil and of deliverance in this literature. Rather, he seeks to describe the different notions found in it and to treat them as though roughly contemporaneous, or at least not chronologically separable, but with a differentiation in purpose and area of usage. Vedic literature, he points out, consists of material for use, in the case of the Saṃhitā and Brāhmaṇa texts, in the ritual connected with social life in the village, and, contrastingly, in the case of the Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads, of material meant for the higher thought of the recluse dwelling in life's latter years in the forest and engaged in meditation. He gives high antiquity

to the Hindu institution of the four stages *(āśrama)* of life for Brahmans. After making proper concession to Dr. Rodhe's reluctance to divide Vedic thought into temporally graduated steps, it still seems true that we can make some sort of chronological, as well as social, division between the ritualism of the bulk of the Rigvedic hymns and the speculations of the "late" philosophic hymns, and, again, between these latter hymns and the ideas of the Upaniṣads which are commonly assumed to be later developments within the same sphere of thought.

Dr. Rodhe's method is basically to study the words used in the Vedic literature to designate evil and release from it. This philological method is in accordance with established scientific procedure since the days of Roth. He makes the point early in his study that the etymologically related words of *pāpman* (noun) and *pāpa* (adjective and noun) are not equivalents, but mean respectively "evil" and "evil work" (perhaps "wrong" would cover his intention in the case of *pāpa* and satisfy both the noun and adjective usages). He points out that sin, or moral wrong committed wilfully, is not necessarily the evil feared by Vedic man; the wrong may come from ritualistic error; in fact, the evil act is not as a rule specifically designated. The most sophisticated intellectual point of view regarding evil lies in the Upaniṣadic notion that both good and wrong deeds constitute evil, and that escape from them and from the cycle of rebirth which accompanies willed action, is possible only for one who transcends considerations of good and evil and leads a life of tranquility, free of desire, concentrated on the highest knowledge.

This study deserves high praise, and students of Indian religion will profit from reading it carefully. Without meaning to derogate from the results so carefully reached by Dr. Rodhe, I should like to add a few suggestions in connection with his topic based upon my own Vedic readings.

In attempting to define Vedic man's differentiation between evil and its opposite, there might be value in considering at length the terms *sat* (existent) and *asat* (non-existent). In the Vedic cosmology, at least in that of the Saṃhitās, these words seem to be used as descriptions or characterizations, respectively, of the ordered world of gods, men, and animals, and the realm of the demons. These were discriminated by Indra after defeating Vṛtra, when he converted the Non-existent *(asat)* into the Existent *(sat)*, as stated in RV 6.24.5. At that

time the Cosmic Order (*ṛta*) was established at Varuṇa's prayer (RV 1.105.15) and he was set over it (RV 10.124.5). The demons still dwell in darkness in the Asat, which is presumably beneath the earth (see JAOS 61 [1941], 76 ff.); in post-Vedic Indian thought the entrance to their place seems to be in the south, the quarter of Nirṛti, goddess of Chaos, whose name appears to mean "Orderlessness." They come out at night to attack men; hence the fearfulness of the night. The adjective *satya* "true" means primarily "conforming to the Existent world (*sat*)." Since Order (*ṛta*) exists only in the Sat, the proper antithesis to *satya* is *anṛta* ("Ṛtaless") or *asatya* ("not conforming to the Sat"). Hence, evil, designated as *anṛta* or *asatya,* is that which does not conform to the Sat, and the problem of good and evil may then be defined as determining what, in Vedic man's estimation, did conform to the Sat and what did not. Obviously, collaboration with the demons (*rakṣas*) inhabiting the Asat and appearing in the Sat at the darkness or other unpropitious times, was *asatya* or *anṛta,* that is, evil. But there is more than this. Every creature in the Sat has work to do according to the Ṛta. Even the gods were borne up to do their work according to the Ṛta (*ṛtekarman*) through the might of Indra (RV 10.55.7); that is, they were set to work at their individual duties. An individual being's work is his *vrata,* a word often translated as "vow, duty," and also often meaning one's individual function in the ordered scheme of the universe. The Ṛta is stated in RV 3.4.7 to consist of observing one's *vrata (ṛtáṃ śáṅsanta ṛtám ít tá āhur ánu vratáṃ vratapá dídhyānaḥ).* Just how a person knows what his *vrata* is, is not made clear in the Veda; RV 9.112 points out that different people have different *vratas,* even within the same family. This old Vedic idea of the importance of fulfilling one's function in the Cosmic Order was an element in developing the dogma of functional specialization for men, which traditional Hinduism considers a part of the institution of caste. Since Varuṇa was the custodian of the Ṛta, an offence against it was cognizable by him. His apparent malevolence, as described by Rodhe, seems misnamed and should rather be considered the action of a conscientious judge, observing his own *vrata,* and therefore putting bonds on one who had violated the Ṛta.

Another point which might be considered is the significance of the "bond" (*pāśa, dāman*). Varuṇa fastens bonds upon the sinner, but there are many passages to show that, through their spells, the crea-

tures of the Asat and their colleagues on Earth also fasten bonds *(pāśa)* upon a victim, or that a man, by his own wrongful action, can put such bonds upon himself. So bound, a man is helpless when the demons come to destroy him. If by luck or care he can escape these demons during life, he may still be waylaid by them after death, as he follows the path leading to eternal life in the blissful place of Yama, Varuṇa, and the other gods. If they catch him, they will annihilate him. But the man who has lived (especially, sacrificed) rightly, gets the help of the gods who watch out for him (are *nṛcakṣas).* On the path itself he is protected by the two dogs of Yama, who guard it, being broad-nosed (that is, keen of scent) and four-eyed (that is, sharp of sight), doubtless to keep the demons away. If free of bonds, he can run past these dogs to safety while they ward off the enemies. No wonder Vedic man feared these bonds and begged for release from them! The bond was not a mere figure of speech to him, but a concrete reality. Its absence or presence meant the difference between eternal life and complete extinction. This seems to have been the earliest Vedic notion of evil, its consequences, and deliverance from them. The notion is considerably different from that of the Upaniṣads. Just as cosmogonic thought developed in the Vedic period from an anthropomorphic myth of Indra slaying Vṛtra so as to produce the Sat from the Asat, and turned to the sophisticated impersonal explanations in RV 10.129 or 10.90, so the conception of ultimate evil was transformed from a single, but complete and final, death to one of recurring death in a usually endless cycle of rebirth from which only pure and full and supreme Knowledge provided salvation.

Dr. Rodhe, from time to time, in his book flirts with the thought that the Vedic ideas of evil and salvation owe something to pre-Aryan beliefs. This notion, which was advanced by various scholars before the reports of the Indus civilizations were published in 1922, seems to draw support in a general way from the discoveries of yogi-like figures among the remains of the second (Harappa) and most extensive of those cultures. Since we cannot read the writing of that culture and have only inferential ideas concerning its spiritual conceptions, we cannot speak about its influence on the Vedic Aryans except speculatively. Dr. Rodhe sums it all up (p. 174): "As long as we do not know more of pre-Vedic India, the Vedic system remains the foundation of Hinduism, however." There is a horizontal curtain at the

farther side of Aryan thought, and the Vedic gods are this side of it. We get no light on what is beyond that curtain from the literature in which those gods are celebrated. As for that highest overseer of them and of all Vedic creation, who is mentioned in RV 10.129.7, "He surely knows—or perhaps He knows not."

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Synoptic Studies in the Old Testament. By Gillis Gerleman. (Offprint from *Lunds Universitets Årsskrift,* Bd. 44, No. 5.) Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1947. 35 pp. Kr. 2:50.

Dr. Gerleman here follows up his *Septuaginta Studies* on Job and Chronicles, which appeared in 1946, with an examination of certain textual peculiarities shared in common by the Septuagint, the Samaritan Pentateuch, and the Hebrew text of Chronicles, which can only be adequately explained by the assumption that, in the earlier books of the Bible, the Masoretes abandoned the vulgar text tradition of their age and revised the text in accordance with their ideas of how a correct text should read.

That the Masoretes (using this word in its widest sense) did revise the text of the Old Testament is well known. That text came down to them from a former age, and, in accordance with the ideas of their own age, they made little alterations to safeguard the Divine names, to disfigure the names of heathen deities, to eliminate indelicate or offensive expressions, to guard against any appearance of anthropomorphism. Gerleman's suggestion in this study is that we have evidence pointing to the fact that they also subjected it to considerable textual revision, with the object of restoring a more archaic form of text in place of the vulgar text of their day. This revision is most complete in the Pentateuch, less so in the Prophets, and still less so in the Hagiographa, which, in their eyes, was the least important section of the Canon.

Gerleman starts with the Samaritan Pentateuch. Gesenius had made an exhaustive examination of this text, and had concluded that, for the most part, it represented a deliberately emended and modernized edition of the Masoretic text. However, Kahle has since pointed to the fact that, when we enquire into the pre-Christian text of the Old

Testament, such texts as the Septuagint and the Pseudepigrapha are obviously unfamiliar with the Masoretic text as we have it, but use a text which has a remarkable number of correspondences with the Samaritan. This suggests that the Samaritan is not an emended and modernized Masoretic text, but rather represents the vulgar text of the pre-Christian period which the Masoretes have revised in the interests of restoring a more archaic type of text. Such a revision by the Masoretes would also help to explain the curious linguistic uniformity of the Hebrew of the Old Testament, which shows strangely little development of language between its oldest and its youngest parts. Such linguistic variation as there is, curiously enough, shows the language in the Prophets and the Hagiographa as progressively less archaic than that of the Pentateuch.

Looking, then, at the Chronicles which are part of the Hagiographa, he compares passages where the Chronicles are parallel with narratives in the Pentateuch and in Samuel-Kings, and finds that, whereas the spelling of names in Chronicles differs from that in the earlier books, it has a remarkable proportion of agreements with the spellings of the Samaritan text, and, in little details of grammar and syntax, of style and arrangement of material, Chronicles similarly agrees with the Samaritan and the Septuagint against the earlier books as represented in the Masoretic text. This means that Chronicles represents the old vulgar text, which the Samaritan and Septuagint also represent, and which has survived in Chronicles because, being only in the Hagiographa, they had not received much attention from the revising zeal of the Masoretes. This conclusion is strengthened when we note that, in a number of cases where the earlier books show the results of the above-mentioned dogmatic emendations introduced by the Masoretes from motives of piety, the Chronicles preserve the unemended forms.

Two other lines of investigation point to the same conclusion. First, the Qere variants recorded for Samuel-Kings correspond in a great many cases with the actual text of Chronicles, and, when compared with the Samaritan and Septuagint evidence, show clearly that they are not drawn from the text of Chronicles, but represent the unrevised text of Samuel-Kings, i.e., the vulgar text of those books before the Masoretes had worked them over. Secondly, a minute comparison of the parallel passages of Samuel-Kings and Chronicles in the Septuagint text, shows that, while there was harmonizing within the Greek ver-

sion, there is yet unimpeachable evidence that the original texts of those books on which the translator was working, were in many details much closer to one another than are their texts in our present Masoretic text.

On this evidence we must conclude that the Masoretes were textual critics whose labors were much more extensive than had been imagined, so that our present Masoretic text, which is the final result of their labors, is a text revised not only to satisfy certain dogmatic requirements, but also in accordance with definite ideas as to what were the characteristics of an older type of text. This, in turn, opens up new prospects for the use of the Samaritan and the Septuagint texts in modern textual criticism.

Dr. Gerleman's study is small in size but big in possibilities, and is sure to be the center of considerable discussion in Old Testament Seminars for some time to come.

ARTHUR JEFFERY

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Art in the Early Church. By WALTER LOWRIE. New York: Pantheon Books, Inc., 1947. xviii, 268 pp. 153 plates. $6.50.

Walter Lowrie, who for many years was rector of the American Episcopal Church in Rome, has by his own count written thirty-four books on theology and church history since his handbook, *Monuments of the Early Church,* appeared in 1901. This in itself is indicative of his interests. The uneasy suspicion has occurred to this reviewer that his latest book, *Art in the Early Church,* is still another in the same vein, for it is certainly not art history, nor yet archeology.

The first book, *Monuments of the Early Church,* was for many years the most useful handbook in English in the field, although it was not, as the author says, "the only comprehensive treatment of the subject in English," for it was preceded by C. W. Bennett's encyclopedic and erudite *Christian Archaeology* (New York, 1888). Forty-seven years have, however, elapsed since Dr. Lowrie's first book, years in which, as the author complains, "this subject has been given a totally different slant." He says that he was "put to considerable pains (not only labor) before he could familiarize himself with modern tendencies and as-

sume a position in regard to them." It is hard to think of any other field of art history where he could have set himself a more impossible task. Evidence is apparent that he has grappled with his "ton of books" from the discussion of fundamental theories in the Prefatory Chapter, but many of the concrete results of modern scholarship fail to appear in his discussion of individual monuments. Thus a number of the errors of the older book are perpetuated and new ones perpetrated.

This is partly due to the author's attitude. He is clearly impatient with the painstaking methodology of modern scholarship and regards much even in his own earlier book as "tedious details" (p. 128). He is not interested in style; he says of the Chair of Maximianus, "It is evident enough that all of the carvings were not made by the same hand —but any student can make this discrimination as well as I." He constantly ridicules the idea that Early Christian art was not homogeneous and that provenance makes a difference. According to Dr. Lowrie, everything stems from Rome. To him there is neither east nor west, north nor south. Arles is mentioned only for the Synod held there, and most of the Gallic monuments are omitted. He is not completely consistent in this attitude, however, since he ascribes the Cathedra of Maximianus to Alexandria and has, in a few other cases, stated at least other scholars' theories of origin. Nor does chronological development interest him. Even when in rare cases as with the sarcophagus of Junius Bassus, an inscription dates the monument, there is no mention of it in the text. The inscription of Sixtus III on the arch of Sta. Maria Maggiore is also ignored, an even more serious omission, since the plate (66 a) has been cut in the center and consequently does not show the inscription. Frequently dates are given only on the plates, but sometimes, as with MS. 43, Stauronikta, Mt. Athos, they are omitted. This is especially misleading, as there is no indication anywhere that it is not an Early Christian manuscript. Far too often the date given is wrong. The nave mosaics of Sta. Maria Maggiore and the small Vatican Virgil have been proved to be fifth century, not fourth;[1] The Monza phials are sixth; 586 as in the text, not 508 as on the plates, is the correct date of the Rabula Gospel; the mosaics of S. Apollinare Nuovo of the sixth century are not "nearly two centuries after the arch of Sta. Maria Maggiore" (first half of the fifth) (p. 155): and the frescoes (not

1. C. R. Morey, *Early Christian Art* (Princeton, 1942), pp. 146, 46-7, and 123.

mosaics) of Old St. Peter's described by Grimaldi were Carolingian, not fourth century.

Iconography also clearly bores the author, and he ridicules scholars who reckon "how many times the paralytic carries his bed upside down and how many times right side up" (p. 172). He is interested, however, in the scenes as illustrations of biblical history and interpretations of dogma. Here Dr. Lowrie has the advantage that Wilpert had of a deep and broad knowledge of Christian history and liturgy. Like the latter, though not always successful, he has interpreted many puzzling scenes. He is apt, perhaps because this is a handbook, merely to list the scenes occurring on the monuments. Of these he gives a most cursory and incomplete description, never a real discussion nor analysis. These lists, however, for the more complex monuments of Chapter VI may prove useful. Since he is interested chiefly in the thought, manners, and customs of the early Christians, he frequently refers to the art rather grudgingly by a mere plate reference. This makes reading tedious, as one must turn every time to the plates, frequently to find something one knows well. At times Dr. Lowrie eliminates discussion entirely and refers one to the index (e.g., "For illustration of the altar consult this subject in the index" [p. 118]. "Ciborium, q.v. in the index"). Because of this practice the index is perhaps the most useful part of the book. With its help one can track down examples of various pieces of furniture, types of dress, roll and codex, and, listed under "hand," various gestures.

The great danger of ignoring style is that one does not recognize later restorations and recuttings. A few examples will prove this point. The modern figure of the clothed Daniel on the sarcophagus of Junius Bassus is twice referred to (pp. 83 and 89) and explained as an apostle! This is all the more surprising since Gerke's book, which reproduces the old engraving showing a nude Daniel between the lions, is in the bibliography. There is no indication of the fact that the statue of St. Hippolytus (pl. 100c) is entirely modern from the waist up. Although the restoration of the apse of Sta. Pudenziana is mentioned, the figure of Christ is called "unspoiled," whereas Wilpert's plate (*Römischen Mosaiken und Malereien,* III, pl. 45) clearly shows that more than half of the face is restored. Again, the silver casket of S. Nazaro, which is in the church of S. Nazaro, Milan, not in S. Ambrogio, has been

proved by C. R. Morey[2] to be a substitution of the end of the 16th century. Dr. Lowrie gives five photographs of this and says, "Here we have a superior artist who had not broken with classical tradition, but did not know the Scriptures nor the traditions of Christian art"!

Modern scholarship is largely ignored. Although Richard Krautheimer is listed in the bibliography, his researches, which have revolutionized our theories of Early Christian architecture and added greatly to our knowledge, seem to have been ignored (e.g., Sta. Maria Maggiore is dated fourth instead of fifth century, and Krautheimer's conclusions both on Pre-Constantinian building and Old St. Peter's are not mentioned). The book also suffers greatly from the blind omission of all Princeton scholarship with the notable exception of Professors Friend and Baldwin Smith. Professor Morey, in spite of his outstanding contribution, is mentioned only once and then to be misquoted (p. 207). Morey did *not* locate the Rossano Gospel in Alexandria but in Asia Minor (*Early Christian Art,* pp. 110 f.). That Dr. Lowrie used this book is evidenced, however, by his following Morey in the discussion of the ciborium columns of S. Marco, where he uses the researches of two of Mr. Morey's students to differentiate the four lower zones from the five upper ones and even (p. 185) quotes Mr. Morey's comment on the artist, but gives no source. There is also no reference to Princeton University's Index of Christian Art and no evidence that he ever consulted it, althought Dr. Lowrie lives in Princeton. The iconographical statistics which he gives rather frequently in Chapter IV are consequently so meagre as to have no significance.

The omission also of the customary tools of scholarship makes the book hard to use. The footnotes are negligible, and since this is not compensated by an adequate bibliography, it is usually impossible to track to their source theories and facts cited in the text. One would like, for example, to know the authority for the statement that it was "no uncommon thing for one man to have a thousand servants" (p. 111). This omission is especially to be regretted in the case of literary references. Captions under the photographs are also frequently inadequate. Cities and museums are often omitted. There is no indication where the Cotton Bible and the Rabula Gospel are today, nor where the capitals, windows, and so forth on plate 48 come from. This recalls

2. *American Journal of Archaeology,* XXIII (1919), 101-25.

the "sample books" of the 19th century, which illustrated much material but wasted a maddening amount of the student's time trying to find present locations. Here a few errors should also be pointed out. The sarcophagus cover (pl. 24c) is in New York in the Metropolitan Museum, not in the Lateran, and plate 39b, labelled "miniature" is a detail of the painted boxcover now in the Museo Sacro of the Vatican Library (Morey, *Early Christian Art,* fig. 129). Bernini's ciborum is not sixteenth century (he was born in 1598), nor is the church copied after that of the Holy Apostles (St. Front, Perigueux) in "Provence," nor does one have to wait after the Gethsemane scene in the Rossanensis until the seventeenth century for another nocturne.

One of the valuable sections of *Monuments of the Early Church,* the discussion of the Cross and the Monogram, has been reprinted in smaller type (pp. 128-30), since, as the author says, "it is not quite in keeping with this new book." But it should be pointed out that two other chapters, the section on Inscriptions (pp. 46-56) and on Textile Art (pp. 215-23) are reprinted with even fewer changes from the earlier book. Why is there no acknowledgment of this in the text?

The book, alas, is marred by many digressions and personal comments. Here is a sample. On the celestial banquet:

> Yet it represents the desire for rest, peace and refreshment which is encouraged by the Bible. Our activistic age, not satisfied with this ideal, demands an opportunity for "service" in heaven, and to satisfy this we have revised the Book of Common Prayer. The revisers, I take it, must have been young men, exuberant exponents of muscular Christianity and the strenuous life, to whom it might seem better to serve in hell than reign in heaven. At my age (Dr. Lowrie is 80), after a laborious life, I long for rest, and in these times especially it is consoling to think that in heaven there will be someone to serve me (p. 71).

And on the basilica:

> But the Church as the Body of Christ needed a house in which to assemble. They needed a meeting house—not in the banal sense in which the word is used by Quakers and Congregationalists, as a place where men meet one another, but in the deeply religious sense that there they meet together with God (p. 113).

a remark as inappropriate as it is false.

We are told that the action of the War Production Board precipitated this book, since Dr. Lowrie wrote it to keep the plates of his earlier book from being melted up for metal. He has consequently used

some 150 of his earlier plates, adding twice as many more. Thus the book is profusely illustrated, for which we can be grateful, although the quality of the earlier plates leaves much to be desired. There is no excuse, however, for reprinting the two appalling drawings of Richter and Taylor of the Joshua scenes of Sta. Maria Maggiore (pl. 53, a and b), nor is the Joshua Roll "inadequately published"; the large facsimile of it by the Vatican editors came out in 1906. Of the new plates, 102b is printed upside down, and the photographs of the mosaics of S. Apollinare Nuovo and the Rossanensis are of such poor quality that they are almost indecipherable, and neither series, by the way, is "complete" (p. 170). The procession of female saints is omitted from the first, the portrait of St. Mark and the page with the four evangelists from the second. The photographs of the Chair of Maximianus and the ciborium columns of S. Marco on the whole are good and, although an Italo-Byzantine work of later date, it is nice to find photographic details of the Salerno altar frontal. The Pantheon Press has produced a fine book, of convenient format with large clear type which it is a pleasure to read. With its numerous plates, it is thus all the more a pity that one can not recommend it either to the young student or the intelligent layman.

MARION LAWRENCE

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Den svenska katekestraditionen mellan Svebilius och Lindblom. By EINAR LILJA. Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrelses Bokförlag, 1947. lii, 352 pp. Kr. 8.

Prästerskapet och det karolinska enväldet. By CARL-E. NORMANN. Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrelses Bokförlag, 1948. xxiv, 364 pp. Kr. 10.

Det svenska prästmötet under medeltiden. By SIGURD KROON. Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrelses Bokförlag, 1948. 189 pp. Kr. 5.

Concurrently with the issuing of the volumes of the new History of the Church of Sweden (five volumes of which have appeared so far), a series of monographs and research studies has been coming regularly from the press under the title. *Samlingar och studier till svenska*

kyrkans historia (also known as *Acta Historico-Ecclesiastica Suecana*). These supplement the formal series and give opportunity for more detailed investigations. Both projects are under the direction of Hilding Pleijel, professor of Ecclesiastical History at Lund University.

The first of these now under review (number 16 of the series), by Einar Lilja, is a bibliographical and historical study of catechetical handbooks appearing in Sweden between 1689 and 1810. The analysis of 148 catechisms in 469 editions yields a most interesting index of the religious ideas and movements which characterized the Church in this century and a quarter. Conservative orthodoxy found expression in the "official" catechism of Archbishop Svebilius, but all through the eighteenth century new forces were at work undermining its predominance. These forces were pietism, first in Spener, then in Zinzendorf's form, and, towards the end of the century, Swedenborgianism and the type of rationalism known as Neology. These influences reached Sweden mainly through Germany, though an interesting exception is an English model by Watts which is reflected in one Swedish catechism.

The interest in catechetical handbooks was a result of the Reformation ideal of an informed laity. The earliest books were written with a view to general congregational instruction. But pietist influences were responsible for a new emphasis on the education of youth, and out of it grew the practice of confirmation, which was a preparation of youth for communion. After 1760 this practice had much to do with the rapid increase of new material. Yet the increase was characterized by conservatism, so that most of the new volumes appeared only in one edition. Pietism was the most effective of the new movements, and infiltrated into orthodox ranks. The officially revised catechism of 1810, Lindblom's, still retained orthodox substance and form, in a cautious neological modification. Schartau's volumes more fully reflected the new psychological interest and pastoral aim which were fruits of pietism, though his works were printed somewhat later than the terminus of this inquiry, 1810.

This carefully documented work is an excellent illustration of a history of ideas which is based on concrete material rather than vague abstractions. It is a splendid contribution to the history of religious education in the eighteenth century, and to the understanding of the spirit and method of the Church of Sweden during that period.

In Number 17 of the series, Carl-E. Normann has given us a scholarly investigation of the attitude of the Swedish Church to the absolutistic policies of the reigns especially of Charles XI and Charles XII, Sweden's "Great Period." Carefully exploring academic text books and dissertations, synodical minutes, homiletical and devotional material, the author has searched for evidence of the thinking of both higher and lower clergy on the relationship of Church and State.

The result is a description of an almost astonishing uniformity of opinion favorable to the authority of the King. Normann believes that this was largely the result of the training of the clergy and of the doctrinal stand of the Church authorities. The Old Testament conception of the rights of the king were held up as justification for the claims of the Swedish monarchy. The king was considered a *vicarius dei,* and far into the eighteenth century his power was defended as a grant of God and not, as the new political theories were urging, as a grant from the people, either directly or by contract.

Not the least interesting element in this study is the contrast it affords to what was going on in England and Holland at this time, echoes of which were heard also in Sweden. One must draw the conclusion that the Swedish Church had gone as far as possible in giving the monarchy a religious defense. But the cause for this attitude is not so much in Luther's doctrine as in the Roman Church's teaching of the close relationship of Church and State. Significantly, the few voices heard in protest to the subservience of the clergy to the monarchy came from quarters that recalled the ancient freedom of the Swedish people, before ever Rome fastened its political as well as its spiritual system on the land.

There were those who charged the clergy with selfish purposes in buttressing the royal domination. Apparently the Church stood to gain while the nobility lost. It would be an interesting subject to study the rise of Pietism, which belongs to this period, from the standpoint of its affording an opportunity of protest to the authority of both Church and monarchy.

In the literature of the relationship of Church and State, this volume is a valuable study of a decisive period in the Church of Sweden. For the non-Swedish reader there is a summary section in English giving the main conclusion of the book.

The diocesan synods of the Church of Sweden in the later Middle Ages is the theme of this original and careful investigation in the sources (Number 18 in the series), by Sigurd Kroon. The result is a picture resembling the conditions on the Continent but bearing some distinctive Swedish traits. From the end of the fourteenth century it is possible to trace the development, and an interesting map of the trade routes indicates that the formative influences were from France and England rather than Germany.

The author is able to establish the dates of most of the diocesan synods as early in July, and finds that the meetings were held once a year, unlike the Continent, where Spring and Fall events were more usual. He argues that the time and place were the same as for the assemblies of the freemen in *landsting*. At first the synods were a phase of the law moot, and laity were included, for there was no distinction between clergy and lay. But soon the sessions were moved to the adjacent cathedral and became exclusively clerical. There is here an interesting suggestion that the breakup of the ancient order, with its lack of distinction between the free peasants, is related, in time at least, to the emergence of a clerical class and an aristocracy which develops, along with royal power, until the old *landsting* becomes a meeting with the king, of the three estates, peasant, clergy, and nobles. Not only were the synods connected with the *folk-moot,* but, as is natural, with the markets which grew up at these meeting places. Thus, the institution of the synod touches on many of the most vital social customs of the Middle Ages. *Prästmötet* became a calendar event.

A concluding section describes the composition, officers, business, and the worship services of the annual synods, which usually lasted three days and followed a set order. The significance of the meetings can hardly be overestimated, for they were the means of holding together a diocese which might be very extensive, and for consolidating the native Church and relating it to the European hierarchical structure. From the settling of local disputes to the election of the bishop, the Synod agenda included all the details of ecclesiastical life, and, on the economic side, the synod served the purpose of gathering the tithes and of confirming donations which made the Church the powerful force it became in the economy of the period.

The volume is a valuable contribution to the understanding of the

way in which Sweden was affected by the introduction of the Roman Church structure. The marks of the system remain to this day.

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Books of Faith and Power. By JOHN T. MCNEILL. New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1947. viii, 183 pp. $2.00.

"He alone," said Kant, "is able to treat anything in a popular manner who could also treat it more thoroughly," and, it may be added, anyone acquainted with Kant's own range of interests and temperament will know that no condescension or snobbishness is implied by the word "popular." Dr. McNeill well illustrates Kant's thesis in this short, but authoritative and well written, book dealing with six classic writings from Protestant Christianity. The author's intention as expressed by himself is twofold: on the one hand he hopes to "arouse in some readers unacquainted with the originals an impulse to study them" (p. vii); on the other, he believes that those already familiar with such texts as are discussed may "find it useful to compare their judgments of them with the impressions here conveyed" (p. vii). Anyone who reads this volume with some care will readily acknowledge that, if either or both of these objectives fail of accomplishment, the deficiency must surely be with the reader and not with the author.

Dr. McNeill devotes approximately an equivalent amount of space to each of the following religious classics: Luther's *On Christian Liberty* (1520), Calvin's *Institutes of the Christian Religion* (1535), Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity* (1593 ff.), Bunyan's *The Pilgrim's Progress* (1678; pt. II, 1685), Law's *A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life* (1728), and Wesley's *Journal* (First entry, 1735). Such a list, as is obvious on the face of it, includes those interpretations of the Christian faith to which the various branches of Protestantism continually look for inspiration and instruction. In each case, the author has very skillfully employed his vast learning to provide a readable and often pleasantly witty account of the contents of each book, a glimpse at the times during which it was composed, together with its effect on those times, and, finally, a brief estimate of the contemporary relevance of its message to the problems of our time. I propose to consider some

of the more significant points made by Dr. McNeill, following the order of his own discussion.

In his consideration of the background of the treatise, *On Christian Liberty,* the author touches on two points of genuine import for a proper understanding of Luther's thought. One is that Luther was sympathetic to the conciliarist principle, and that consequently he continued to call for reform of the church through a general council (p. 6), and the other is the decided attention Luther paid to the doctrine of the church. Contrary to the facts, it is often supposed, in many discussions of the relations between Protestantism and Catholicism, that Luther gave little or no thought to the church and its structure, because he had only a mystical appreciation of its reality.

In this main treatise of Luther's works of 1520, Dr. McNeill makes central the paradox, one half of which is frequently omitted, that the "Christian man is perfectly free lord of all, subject to none," and yet that he is "a perfectly dutiful servant of all, subject to all." This seemingly ambiguous position of the believer is finally interpreted to mean that the Christian, through Christ, "is lord over sin and death" (p. 16), and that because of his gratitude for salvation he "gladly serves his fellow men" (p. 16). The significant point is that the freedom which the Christian has through faith does not set him above good works, but it saves him, as Luther constantly emphasized, from false opinions concerning good works.

Dr. McNeill, despite the limited space at his disposal, very frankly deals with the much discussed question of Luther's relation to the events of the past two decades in Germany (pp. 22 ff.). He makes it clear that much must be omitted from Luther in order to support the "Luther to Hitler" theory, and, especially, that the purely religious intention of Luther must be ignored. The summary judgment of one so well acquainted with the data as the author undoubtedly is, is certainly not without interest; "As one who has given a good deal of attention to the reformer's political thought, I feel justified in saying that Luther would have abhorred Hitler and all his works" (p. 24).

Of significance in the discussion of Calvin is the question of the purpose behind the original edition of the *Institutes* and the change in that purpose through succeeding editions. Dr. McNeill points out that, in the introductory address intended for Francis I, Calvin originally planned only an exposition of the faith, but that, due to the severe

persecutions in France in 1535, he altered his plan, striving rather to make a defense of Protestantism against those who, in his view, were misrepresenting it. Contrary to the opinion of Beza and others that Calvin never altered his teachings after the first edition, the author points out that, in subsequent editions, the aim is slightly modified from a strictly apologetic one to that of providing a more systematic treatise for the training of young theologians.

Having indicated the purpose of the *Institutes,* Dr. McNeill proceeds to a brief consideration of the four main themes forming the subjects of the four books into which the whole is divided. Space permits reference to two points only, the idea of predestination and Calvin's views on civil government. The author points out, and with good reason, that the doctrine of predestination as outlined by Calvin, though undoubtedly not without a scriptural basis, requires that the relevance of certain biblical passages which do not appear to support it be argued away (see *Institutes,* III, xxxiii). A question might be raised in passing as to the accuracy of Dr. McNeill's expression, "the doctrine of predestination *or* election" (p. 50, italics mine), especially in the light of the discussions of Calvinists among themselves. Calvin does not use the words synonymously in his own discussion in the last chapters of Book III.

Of great interest are the author's remarks about Calvin's ideas on civil government. These are, of course, of peculiar significance because of the much discussed question of the relation between Calvinism and democracy. Dr. McNeill states that Calvin supports neither popular rule nor monarchy, but advocates "a spread of responsibility among the most capable—'aristocracy mixed with democracy' " (p. 54). Calvin's view, the author concludes, ultimately leads to the position of limited monarchy, and perhaps to republicanism.

The relation of the English Reformation to that on the continent has been and still is a subject of the greatest importance. Dr. McNeill's discussion of Hooker throws some light on this theme. He refers at the outset to the *Ecclesiastical Polity* as the "crowning literary expression of the English Reformation" (p. 61), and then goes on to treat, among other things, the relation of Hooker's position to that of the continental figures. On the whole, the author is inclined to question the sharp contrast that has often been made in this connection, and he believes that, for all of Hooker's satisfaction with the Church

of England as it existed in his time, he was certainly not hostile to the spirit of the continental Reformation. In passing, it may be noted that Dr. McNeill calls attention to the basic rationalism of Hooker, and also to his belief in the authority of general councils, and his faith in the prophetic possibilities of the conciliarist position (a position about which Dr. McNeill has already written at some length in another volume).

The author's sense of humor reveals itself delightfully in the pages on John Bunyan (see esp. pp. 96-99), and this is all to the good, particularly at this point, since the deep import of Bunyan's own struggles and the interpretation he placed thereon are often lost to those who approach him having in mind only the typical caricature of the "puritan" as a person without any sense of humor whatever. Worthy of mention is the attraction which Luther's *Commentary on Galatians* had for Bunyan as revealed in his own confession, " 'I do prefer this book of Martin Luther upon the Galatians, excepting the Holy Bible, before all books that ever I have seen, as most fit for a wounded conscience' " (p. 94). Dr. McNeill shows how Bunyan's inner struggles provided the wellspring for his allegories, and, from his analysis, it may be seen that if ever Dwight Moody's dictum, "I have had more trouble with myself than with any other man I have ever met," applied to any one it could certainly have applied to Bunyan. As the author shows, Bunyan made the most effective use of his remarkable gifts of imagination, and it is to this factor rather than to any other that his religious power is to be ascribed. Mr. By-ends, Mr. Worldly Wiseman, and Christian, among others, continue to live in the mind of the perceptive reader long after the concepts of a less richly imaginative writer have faded and lost their power to influence life.

Of all the writings included in this book, the *Serious Call* of William Law may be, and probably is, the least familiar to the average reader (a new edition of this work edited by J. V. Moldenhawer has recently appeared). Dr. McNeill calls attention to its historical importance because it appeared in England in the "reign" of Walpole, hardly a period distinguished for its moral purity, and to its perennial importance as a document dealing with the exalted theme of the duty of the Christian in the world of which he finds himself a part. Among other things, the author discusses the relation between Law and Wesley, the extent to which Law recognized the religious significance of

an earthly calling (pp. 127 f. esp.), Law's mysticism and his relation to Boehme, his great respect for discipline and order in the religious life, his appeal to the wealthy in contrast to Wesley's ministry to the poor and underprivileged, and, finally, his moralism and excessive concern for good works. Dr. McNeill concludes the discussion by referring to certain distinguished figures who have found Law's *Serious Call* most absorbing, among whom was Dr. Johnson. The latter, though he generally described his youth as a time when he talked against religion a great deal, confessed, "I found Law quite an over-match for me; and this was the first occasion of my thinking in earnest" (p. 149, see Joseph W. Krutch's *Johnson,* p. 18). Those familiar with the famous doctor may, on this account alone, be led to read Law in order to discover what it was that set a man of Johnson's stature to thinking seriously about religion.

The book closes with the latest of the writings selected, Wesley's *Journal.* At the outset, Dr. McNeill calls attention to the statement of William Haller, in his *Rise of Puritanism,* to the effect that the private diary was to the Puritan what the confessional had been to the medieval Christian, and he believes that Wesley's *Journal* is to be regarded as a record of a similar sort, with the exception that, in the later entries, Wesley describes not so much the state of his own soul as the nature of the movement to which his preaching and teaching was giving rise. Dr. McNeill begins, as Wesley's *Journal* does, with the mission to America in 1735, and the motive behind the venture is disclosed, according to Wesley's own statement, as "the hope of saving my own soul" (p. 157). The significance of this mission for Wesley's inner development is brought out by the author when he says, "Wesley returned to England beaten to his knees" (p. 162), and by Wesley himself, when he said, " 'I that went to America to convert others was never myself converted to God' " (p. 162). Dr. McNeill concludes that Wesley did not fully realize at that time the meaning of his venture, and that he was, in fact, nearer to a genuine faith than he knew.

Of special interest is the account of Wesley's famous Aldersgate experience, particularly the relation of Luther's *Epistle to the Romans* to this. Dr. McNeill calls attention to two papers dealing with the all important question of the text most probably employed at the time (p. 164). In addition, he notes Wesley's belief in the primacy of faith, and also the marked Calvinist (rather than Lutheran) and puritanical

character of his thought, particularly with respect to the doctrine of justification, but also in the high regard he had for the consistency with which the sanctified believer actually made his faith visible in his conduct. Many more things should be said here about Wesley's travels and his preaching. Suffice it to close the account by referring to a summary passage concerning the social and religious situation brought to light in the *Journal:*

> It reveals in unvarnished realism the dangerous substratum of barbarism in eighteenth-century society, the helpless starvation of the destitute, the filth and misery of the jails, the ignorance and suspicion of the working classes, the roads, muddy but improving through the years. Wesley moves over these highways and byways with such haste and joy of movement that we fail to realize their length and weariness. For the King's business required haste. Men were perishing for the message which a merciful God had placed upon his lips (pp. 181 f.).

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The Religion of Philosophers. By JAMES H. DUNHAM. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1947. 314 pp. $4.00.

This is an extremely valuable book, which I read with great interest. The author uses his wide and critical knowledge of the history of philosophy to determine what rational basis the philosophers presented here have found for religion. Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Marcus Aurelius, Augustine, Leibniz, Spinoza, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and Auguste Comte, the ten the author has selected, offer a wide variety of approach to the problem and reach very differing results. But Professor Dunham's interest is not primarily historical; insight into the truth of religious tenets is his main concern. He presents, therefore, not merely a statement, historically as exact as possible, of the underlying philosophies of the different thinkers; he carefully criticizes and evaluates them. It would have been illuminating if he had added a chapter stating in connected form the results reached through this historical approach. But that would probably have required more than one chapter. Perhaps he clung too closely to Schelling's thesis that "history conducts an illuminating dialectic" (p. 40).

I shall not attempt to give a short resumé of the results reached by the ten philosophers. The critical study presented by the author de-

serves to be read as a whole and with great care. I want to state here only a few aspects of the whole problem.

1. Religion, it is clearly shown, is not a concern apart and distinct from philosophy, as many well-meaning persons assume. They know that philosophy is based on reason; but religion, they say, stresses faith. And, of course, there is a fundamental difference between the two. Faith is a kind of acceptance, i.e., an act of will, not of reason. However, acceptance is required also in domains other than that of religion: we must accept moral standards, if they are to become operative; we must accept the results of scientific investigation, if we are to apply them. But in all cases—and this is most obvious in the latter—this presupposes that what we are asked to accept, to put our faith in, is *true,* at least as far as we are able to establish it. And this applies also to religion: its articles of faith, its creeds, need to be established as true. This is what the ten philosophers of the book tell those who want to base their religion on faith alone, with disregard of reason.

But here enters an important consideration, which has emerged and, only rather recently, become fairly clear. I mean the fact that a proposition established as true is so only in a certain domain; it may be false or irrevelant in a different domain, or "universe." So it becomes necessary to determine carefully the universe in which we establish the proposition or system of propositions. This crucial fact became evident through the development of Non-Euclidian geometries; it led to the different types of algebra; it is fundamental in modern (mathematical) logic. But it is of still wider sweep. We may put it this way: a system of propositions is the solution of a certain fundamental problem; whether any of the propositions, established to be true as parts of the solution of one fundamental problem, are true also in the domain of a different fundamental problem requires investigation.

Applying this to our present situation, we must ask: Is religious faith concerned with a distinct type of problem? Distinct from mathematics or physics, for example? And if so, what is it?

The early thinkers who made religion the topic of their most earnest thought did not make this distinction; they lumped all kinds and types of problems together, as is perfectly obvious in the Old Testament; and it runs through the history of religious thought. We, however, do not ask religious leaders to give a true account of the physical universe, nor of man in it.

2. One type of problem, however, is still linked closely with sincere religious thought even today, namely, the ethical problem. Thus the fundamental law of Christian religion combines the command to love God with the command to love your neighbor. Comte even omits the first and makes the second, which we would consider a typically ethical imperative, the whole object of religion. Historically, it would seem more correct to make God the main topic of religion. Comte's procedure seems more like a counsel of despair; he does not believe that the existence of God can be established. But the question now is: should the ethical demand be included in religion?

Ethics, being concerned with the evaluation and direction of human motives and volitions, or the objects of our desires, is a definite type of problem in the solution of which we develop certain propositions which are not dependent on religious truth. God is not an object in ethics.

3. The topic of the religious thought of the philosophers under consideration (omitting Comte) is God, his "nature" and his existence. It does not seem as if the search had been successful. What is the reason for this? They attempted to establish the existence of God as an *object,* yet not as an entity of mathematics, or physics, or any other science. These have their own defined objects. Even if we took them all together and studied God as the totality of reality, we could repeat in religion only what the various sciences teach in their own domains. And we would omit a type of entity with which these objective sciences are not concerned, entities which are not "objects." Of course, whatever we think about is, at the time, an object, the object of our thought. Yet it is necessary to make a distinction between the object of thought and the thinker of the thought. A physicist may observe, experiment, think, and develop a law; he, the man, the thinker, is distinct from what he thinks. What he thinks is physical reality, if he can establish these objects of his thought as true. But I may make the physicist himself my problem; not only the physical man, but the thinker and his thought; the *subject,* the psyche, the soul. We call this type of problem psychology. It is not concerned with "realities," i.e., objective existences, but with subjective existences, which have been called "actualities," stressing in the word the "act," or, better, the actor, the thinker who performs the act.

In this study, in this type of problem, the procedure differs from

that followed in the study of "objects." The object is approached directly; the subject can be studied only indirectly: what it is must be inferred from what it does, from its acts, whatever they are. The acts, which themselves are objects, reveal to us what the subject is. Such an actuality is the psyche of psychology; and here the indirect method has been employed in the study of "intelligence" by means of intelligence tests. In fact, the same procedure, in a less scientific form, has always been used, and it is not limited to intelligence. We say: "Shakespeare is a great dramatic poet," not because we have studied the man directly; we have inferred it from his dramas.

I suggest that God be studied by philosophers in the same manner. He has been called a Spirit—I suppose largely because He could not be seen or touched! Let us infer what He is from what He does.

But what does He do? What is there, what acts occur which cannot be explained in purely human terms? That is the problem of theology, the last problem of philosophy. And, if we see now that Newton's reason created the law of gravitation, why is this statement not sufficient? It suffices for the physicist; in fact, it is not even needed by him; all he is concerned with is the law of gravitation and whether it is a true law. The psychologist may study Newton; and, if he finds out what kind of mind Newton had, he is satisfied. Why should we step beyond Newton's reason; what warrant is there for saying, as Zaberella argues of Aristotle, "that God as active Reason guides the reason of man . . . ," that "a Supreme Spirit . . . imprints such ideas upon our minds . . . that is to say, Laws, upon the objects of the world" (p. 65)? Professor Dunham may be correct in rejecting this as a sound interpretation of Aristotle's philosophy. Yet, to me, it seems to point the way toward the right method of studying God, both His nature and His existence.

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Behold the Spirit: A Study in the Necessity of Mystical Religion. By ALAN W. WATTS. New York: Pantheon Books, 1947. 254 pp. $2.75.

Alan Watts is an Englishman who, after achieving some distinction in Buddhist studies, has returned to the Church of his fathers and now ministers in the Anglican priesthood as chaplain to Episcopal students at Northwestern University. It seems worthwhile to note these personal

items, since each of them has a definite relevance to the structure of his book; he writes as a student of mysticism who is also a pastor of modern American youth, and as one who has had unusual opportunities for viewing from within the contrasting experiences of modern life, Oriental philosophy, and Catholic Christianity. His message is a refreshingly vigorous one; in an age when so many exponents of religion apologize, defend, or explain, he proclaims that we are on the eve of a new and great mystical age, and that this is the necessary next step in the life of our civilization. Ethics, religion, art, worship, and common life must be transfigured by the consciousness of the constant presence of the divine.

The readers of this *Review* will doubtless approach Watts's many-sided book from a variety of different angles, and the reviewer must mainly present his own. His historical interpretation is an adaptation of Spengler's scheme of the growth, maturity, and old age of cultures; he suggests that we are now, as was the Greco-Roman world of the early Christian centuries, in a period of maturity likely to flower into a "second religiousness," in which, however, Spengler sees only decay and Watts the garnering of wisdom. I would suggest that Toynbee would be more to our author's purpose than the scheme which he rather arbitrarily adopts. The phenomenon just mentioned appears more hopefully in Toynbee as the rise of universal faiths in the time of troubles or under the universal state, which are likely to be the subsequent stages after the growth of a civilization has been checked. Toynbee would also warn him against carrying too far the analogy between the stages of cultural history and those of individual life. Watts seems to me a little too fascinated by the interpretation of the Dark Ages as the childhood, the Middle Ages as the early adolescence, and our own time as the maturity of our western culture. There are some points of parallel, and they suggest valuable observations; but the analogy is only partial and, in spite of warnings to the contrary, suggests a feeling of superiority on the part of those who claim to represent maturity. It is dangerous to patronize St. Thomas Aquinas; we are likely to find the old friar smiling down at us yet. Besides, the Christian Gospel, although it does speak of developing into fullness of age in Christ, tells us more emphatically that the Kingdom of Heaven can only be entered by those who become as little children.

A specially valuable section of the book is that which suggests what

the Christian tradition might profitably learn from Oriental philosophical-religious traditions. Knowing the world of Oriental thought more intimately than most Christians, even than those sympathetic to the idea of learning from it, Watts offers valuable suggestions as to how the spiritual technique of Zen, the expression of a world-view in Chinese art, or the definitions of Hindu philosophy, could enrich the Catholic faith and make it more fully deserving of the name. I commend his modesty in not offering more than suggestions; we still await the great Indian theologian (we must for the moment make do with Dr. Appasamy) or the great Chinese heretic, and a westerner can only point out what might be done in this field. Watts's suggestions seem to be good ones—although I doubt the significance of his proposal that the Vedantic idea of "non-duality" offers a valuable understanding of God as one who has no opposite (p. 143, etc.). Or rather, it seems to me less of an innovation than Watts suggests, but a restatement of propositions well-known in both dogmatic and mystical theology, that the only opposite of the divine being is non-existence, and that unity and diversity ultimately consist in God in a manner which the tools of our mental equipment can indicate but not describe. Writing as a Catholic Christian, Watts does not anticipate the union of Christian and Oriental traditions in a third entity, nor even a development in which their own past might take the place of the Law and the Prophets for Oriental Christians. English-speaking Christians can be modest in this matter, since we are content to be Semitic in our religion and Greek in our philosophy, retaining little from our own national ancestry but a few customs and words. What we may properly hope for is the recognition of the wisdom of the East as capable of flowing into the stream of Catholic thought and piety, much as the early Church was able to extend a welcome to the wisdom of the Greeks. It is in this sense, I believe, that Father Watts (and the present writer) would look forward to a genuine unification of spiritual forces.

The second half of the book offers a presentation of Christian thought and practice on the basis of the hopes and convictions expressed in the first. The reviewer would describe this briefly as, in the best sense of the word, one-sided. Watts's convictions center around the unity of being, the revelation of eternal truth, the constant presence of God. Hence "the important thing about events is not how they happened but what they mean" (p. 61), and the Eucharist is "an act of

symbolic contemplation" (p. 225). It destroys the proportion of faith, I feel obliged to say, if one does not also say that events are important because they have results, and that Christian worship is significant because in it something happens—its central prayer, in old Latin terminology, properly called the *actio missae*. There are many admirable statements in Watts's book, and some details open to specific correction, but I am convinced that the main point to challenge from the point of view of the Christian faith is his effort to make half the truth (a half often neglected and needing constant re-emphasis) do the work of the whole. He constantly endeavors to include the particular as an aspect of the one, since he is too intelligent and too Christian to wish in any way to ignore the particular. But it is simpler and truer to give it its own rights in its own name. On one point, the practical relation of God and man, he claims to be "incarnational," yet throughout seems to regard the Incarnation as revelation rather than event. The Catholic Faith presents us with the wonderful truth of the Eternal Word, but also with the scandal of our redemption by a crucified Jew from the results of a genuine Fall.

Watts's suggestions in the field of religious practice contain much that is valuable, especially his emphasis that the love of God is the goal and meaning of all life, not a special activity within it. Play, work and reform, perhaps in that order (which most modern leaders would reverse) are lovely and divine. Watts states neatly a principle which some of us will remember as dear to William Temple: "The Christian feeds the hungry, heals the sick, clothes the naked and disciplines himself that all may share and enjoy the very greatest of goods—God himself. Because God is love, to love another soul is to give him God" (p. 187). In some details I find Watts more of a conventional Anglican than he perhaps realizes. It is distressing to the Catholic mind to find a long section on the cult of Mary which speaks only of its alleged function as a compensation for the failure to recognize "feminine" elements in the divine nature, with no word of affection for the Mother of Jesus. On the other hand, one may welcome with joy a suggestion that spiritual retreats should be really periods of rest in the Lord in place of the energetic drill of Ignatian exercises (useful as that approach may be in its place).

One criticizes a work in such detail only when convinced of its importance and value. This book has already been found useful by many

who are ready for a call to the heart of religion, which is not organization, or activity, or methods of prayer, but quite simply God. I hope that there is much that those who do not share Father Watts's particular convictions and loyalties, the Protestant or the non-Christian, may find stimulating and heartening—if they are prepared to be warned that in a *Review* like this we may have been playing with the eternal fire. For those who stand closer to his own position, Watts issues a call to take seriously in its fullest meaning the Catholic Faith which we profess. For reasons already indicated, I cannot recommend him as a sole spiritual guide. I hope that he will continue to grow, eliminating some of the defects which mar so good a work (among them the manner of his criticisms, which are often acute, but sometimes expressed in a style which aims to be prophetic and succeeds only in being slightly sarcastic). He has much to teach us all. He is dealing with the most important of all topics, the love of God; and is prepared to startle the religious world by saying so.

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World Christianity. By Henry P. Van Dusen. Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1947, 302 pp. $2.50.

This book is, in my opinion, a very useful work which furnishes excellent reading for any person interested in the historical development of the Christian movement. One finds in it an abundance of data regarding the development of Christianity during the past 150 years. It also contains a group of four extremely useful appendixes: (1) A Chronology of Christian Co-operation and Union, 1795-1946; (2) The Ecumenical Tree; (3) The World Council of Churches: List of member churches, May 1, 1947; (4) Church Union in South India. Throughout the book the author maintains a vigorous optimism as a prophet of the future of historic Christianity. This optimism is not mere wishful thinking; it is based quite securely, I think, upon a sound historical realism.

The book represents a determined attempt to offer some helpful information and constructive thought on the problem of Christian unity. The problem is approached historically. Some readers will doubtless be disappointed to find this book lacking in a critical theological analysis of the problem. However, the author is fully alive to the theological

complexity of the problem, and he outlines the issues, as they stand historically, with which Christian leaders must come to grips. The reader will be interested in and encouraged by the non-denominational and broadly universal perspective from which it is written. The title is aptly indicative of the broad spirit which breathes throughout.

The book is divided into five parts: (1) The Rediscovery of the Church; (2) World Christianity Yesterday; (3) World Christianity Today; (4) World Christianity Tomorrow; (5) Conclusion—Revival and Reunion. The question of its validity and worth as a contribution to contemporary religious thought lies, as this reviewer sees it, in six major ideas embedded in the arguments of the book.

First, the author champions the historical view of Christianity. The present situation must be understood and evaluated in relation to Christianity's historical development. The present is rooted in and determined by the past, and it must, therefore, be viewed in the light of the past. Hence one finds in Chapter II a survey of the recent monumental work of the great church historian, Kenneth S. Latourette, *A History of the Expansion of Christianity* (Vols. I-VII). Dr. Van Dusen sums up the historian's thesis in a word:

> Here, then, is the main teaching of the history: Over nineteen centuries the Christian movement has spread to an ever wider circumference and permeated with ever deeper imprint the life of mankind. But its progress has been through a sequence of periodic advances and retreats. Today we may be standing close to the beginning of one of the phases of regression (p. 56).

However, we must bear in mind (1) that each period of regression (500-950; 1350-1500; 1750-1815) has been considerably less in temporal duration than the preceding one; (2) that each period thus far has been followed by an advance which brought Christianity to a high water mark in its influence upon humanity; and (3) that the impulses of vitality for a novel advance of Christianity come not from the established centers but from "the cultural frontier." Hence, Christianity today may be approaching the threshold of the most glorious era of expansion in its history. But from whence may we expect the "sovereign irresponsibility of the Holy Spirit" to give birth to the light and power which will generate this new era? The author leaves his reader to quest for the answer.

A second thesis, which is a bit exaggerated, is that for eighteen cen-

turies, although the Christian ideal of unity was often saluted by leading Christian thinkers, *the ruling tendency was centrifugal.*

> The dawn of the nineteenth century marks a radical reversal of trends dominant throughout the preceding eighteen centuries in the fortunes of Christian unity. Regnant centrifugal forces which, despite all protestations of purpose and sincere aspirations toward concord, had severed Christendom century by century into ever more numerous, more diverse, and more mutually intolerant groups gave way to gentle—at first almost imperceptible, but steadily swelling—centripetal influences which have effected larger accomplishment in Christian understanding and respect, practical co-operation and federation, and even church union than the most optimistic realist of the late eighteenth century would have dared to forecast (p. 80).

The author does not correlate this argument with the character of the cultural development of the nineteenth century, but there are numerous facts which would lend support to the latter part of this thesis—the rise of the historical sense; the breaking down of dogmatic barriers by Liberal Protestantism; the emergence of an organismic view of man and his world; and a growing criticism of the spirit of Nationalism. Nevertheless, the thesis that the Christianity of the past 150 years has been characterized by a dominant trend toward unity is well supported by a citation of the growth of numerous types of association and union within and cutting across denominational barriers. In these many movements Dr. Van Dusen sees (1) the evolution of conferences into continuing organizations, and (2) the replacement of individual Christian sponsorships by "official" church participation.

The former part of this thesis, however, is somewhat overdrawn. In view of the achievement of unity in the great Middle Ages, theologically, ecclesiastically, and culturally, however valid be the "protest" against the principle of church authority upon which this unity was based, one can hardly describe this period as one in which the "dominant trend" was "centrifugal." Dr. Van Dusen's statement here, as in most generalizations, is not strictly in accord with the facts.

The third major idea is found in an affirmation repeated frequently throughout the book:

> Today, world Christianity is the only living, healthful world reality, the only existing world community—to those with eyes to see, a rebuke to the nations for the unreality of their divisions and conflicts; to a yearning humanity, a promise, a foretaste of the community of peoples which might be, and some day *must* be (p. 32).

This thesis is supported in the first chapter by an argument demonstrating that the second world war proved to be the occasion for a rediscovery of the Church. Throughout the world the Church has been rediscovered (1) as "the one indomitable, invincible champion of human rights"; (2) as "the one omnipresent, dauntless ministrant to human need"; and (3) as "the one invulnerable, indestructible world community."

This thesis is fairly well supported by the arguments offered by the author, although one wonders just how significant and potent *in fact* this "world reality" is, *as a world reality*. If this argument is true, of course it is of profound and perhaps prophetic significance in our hope for the future of the world.

Another major idea of the book grows out of the author's conviction that some kind of organic church unity is an integral part of Christian unity as God intends it. The author is fully aware of the demonic quality which attaches to Christian unity when it veers in the direction of church authority of the Roman Catholic type. However, he believes it is erroneous to hold that the Christian ideal of unity is exhausted by the unity which consists in the broad community of thought and faith and ethical ideals common to Christians throughout the world. Some kind of corporate union is also a part of the ideal. Of course, the Protestant world has not yet achieved this latter kind of unity. Hence, the author finds the ideal toward which he is striving somewhat difficult to define. He is emphatic and clear as to the first step toward unity: "The crux of the problem of Christian unity lies not in the decision as to the ultimate goal between fellowship and federation or corporate union . . . or between federation and corporate union . . . but rather in the achievement of full mutual recognition. . . ." (p. 224). The figure of the "family of God" is suggested as a fruitful conception thus far unexplored. In terms of this conception a greater unity than we have thus far achieved may be possible. The familial pattern provides both for "organic and indissolvable kinship" and also for "free and profound common loyalty." By building a world family of churches, Dr. Van Dusen feels that we might attain unto a Christian order comparable to the order of the family, "which conserves both the autonomy of persons and their necessary interdependence for individual and corporate fulfillment" (p. 234). He admits, however, that

this type of Christian unity might, in the last analysis, "imply an order closer to federation than corporate union."

The author makes much of "the principle of comprehension." One of the most encouraging pieces of information which this book offers is that in the realm of faith (the doctrines of God, man, Jesus Christ, salvation, etc.) "unanimous agreement" was achieved by the world conference of the Faith and Order Movement at Lausanne in 1927, at the World Missionary Conference in Jerusalem in 1928, and at the meeting of the Faith and Order Movement again at the Edinburgh Conference in 1937, where it was stated: "We agree . . . that there is in connection with this subject no great need for maintaining division between churches." At the World Missionary Conference in Madras in 1938, *"The Faith By Which the Church Lives"* received unanimous assent. This theological unity is certainly an amazing achievement in Protestantism.

Dr. Van Dusen goes ahead to argue that most groups do not consider differences in liturgical emphasis and in the interpretations of the sacraments to be major obstacles in the path to unity. Church polity is a more formidable barrier, but he proposes a solution of this difficulty in keeping with the liberal "principle of comprehension." He suggests the solution which was actually adopted by the Faith and Order Conference at Lausanne in 1927 and at Edinburgh in 1937. This solution attempts to incorporate within the church universal the value and validity of the three major historical forms of church organization: Episcopal, Presbyterial, Congregational.

This same principle of comprehension is offered also as a solution of the problem of variety of interpretation in regard to baptism, the Eucharist and the ministry. Most Protestants will likely feel that Dr. Van Dusen unduly extends the principle of comprehension in his attempt to effect a synthesis of the Lord's Supper of Protestant worship with the Roman Catholic doctrine of the Mass. How the superstition of the Mass can be brought into working agreement with intelligible faith is difficult for this reviewer to understand. Surely the ideal of Christian togetherness must call for greater theological depth than this. But perhaps Van Dusen's point is that such a compromise would throw Christians together, and that, within the context of a greater togetherness than now prevails, we might better be able to see so deeply

into the true nature of Christianity that we would ultimately arrive at a unity of greater theological depth. However, he does not say this. He says that there is a permanent value in the Roman Catholic doctrine of the Mass (pp. 229-30), and that it should be preserved, therefore, *alongside* the Protestant practice.

Finally, Dr. Van Dusen attaches great significance in various passages of the book to radical divergence in the trends of world culture and of Christianity during the past fifteen years. This, he says, "may be the most significant single fact" about the ecumenical movement. He writes that,

> while the movement for Christian unity went forward parallel to world trends in cooperation so long as the latter were in flood, it is during the past fifteen years, when the drift in world affairs has been violently disruptive and disintegrative, that the most far-reaching and noteworthy advances in Christian unity have been recorded. This is the justification for the sober declaration of the Madras Conference, now often quoted: "The decade since last we met has witnessed the progressive rending of the fabric of humanity; it has witnessed an increasing unification of the body of Christ." What has been taking place within the churches cannot be described as a "drift." Rather, it discloses deep and powerful currents pressing, resolute and indomitable, directly against the sweeping torrents of the time (pp. 101-2).

It seems to this reviewer that we are still much too close to this historical development adequately to evaluate it. It is possible that Dr. Van Dusen has formed too hasty a judgment at this point. Of course, it is to be hoped that his enthusiasm, generated by the resoluteness with which Christian leaders have moved forward toward the realization of a greater unity, will not meet disappointment.

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Modern Nationalism and Religion. By Salo Wittmayer Baron. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947. x, 363 pp. $5.00.

This expansion of four lectures delivered upon the Rauschenbusch Lectureship Foundation of the Colgate-Rochester Divinity School, in 1944, is easily the most creative volume in the entire series and a pioneering effort of grand magnitude in the attempt to obtain a comprehensive interpretation of the interrelations between nationalism and organized religion in the modern western world.

In his definition of terms, Baron observes that "people" represents a phenomenon of life; nationality a phenomenon of consciousness; and nationalism a phenomenon of superconsciousness. This superconsciousness appears in many varieties, such as, cultural nationalism of a common language, literature, and mores; political nationalism varying from patriotism, English constitutionalism, American democratic individualism, and French voluntarism to German integral nationalism; economic nationalism; religious nationalism, for example, political Catholicism disguised as sectarianism; racism, where chosenness degenerates into a "blood and iron," "blood and soil" ideology.

During World War I, nationalism succeeded in breaking up the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Turkey, and Czarist Russia. But the socialist international also achieved its first major victory in the success of communism in Russia. The Fourteen Points of Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations were headed in the right direction, but proved unenforceable against nations refusing to surrender on any aspects of sovereignty. The League could maintain peace among the small states but was impotent in the case of the great mandatory powers and Japanese, Italian, and German aggression. The expansionist trends in China, Ethiopia, the Italian-German-Vatican intervention in Spain, the rape of Austria, Sudeten lands, and Czechoslovakia issued in a new brand of imperialism by violence. The internal contradictions of fascism inaugurated World War II. Its antithesis was the Four Freedoms, the Atlantic Charter, and the United Nations.

Five nationalist fathers—Rousseau, Burke, Jefferson, Fichte, and Mazzini, representing France, England, the United States, Germany, and Italy—are discovered, but only three nationalist epigoni—Maurros of France, Mussolini of Italy, and Rosenberg of Germany. Neither Huey Long nor Father Coughlin ever attained truly national stature. In England, Sir Oswald Mosley, G. K. Chesterton, and Hilaire Belloc likewise failed to capture sufficient nationalist support. Indeed, Belloc principally desired to

> apply the fruits which the Catholic culture had produced when it was in full vigor, the restriction of monopoly, the curbing of the money power, the establishment of co-operative work, and the wide distribution of private property, the main principles of the Guild and the jealous restriction of usury and competition which between them have come so near to destroying us (p. 87).

Constitutional nationalism in England and democratic nationalism in the United States are the mortal enemies of integral nationalism.

Chapter IV, "Catholic Interterritorialism," tells the complicated story very interestingly, deriving its data from Catholic, convert to Catholicism, and critical historians alike. The notes are very illuminating. Pius XII explains his inability to pass judgment on some questions thus: *Sancta Mater Ecclesia* is a mother of all. Hence, "she does not and cannot belong exclusively to this or that people, nor even more to one than to others but equally to all"! After the nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia, the Vatican extolled Spain as a nation "chosen by God as the principal instrument for the evangelization of the new world and as the impregnable bulwark of the catholic faith. . . ."

In chapter V, Baron deals with Protestant individualism and liberty loving nationalism, sketching the development from Luther and Calvin to Schleiermacher and Karl Barth. The ecumenical movement is viewed as too particularistic in today's one world. Protestantism is given considerable credit as a builder of both the League of Nations and the United Nations—Woodrow Wilson, Cecil, Smuts, Churchill, Roosevelt. The crisis-theology of Barth is described as a reactionary political force, "an extremely pessimistic reinterpretation of the old Calvinistic doctrine of predestination," helping to "undermine whatever community of action might have developed between the antinationalist minority and other progressive forces" in Germany (p. 145). At least 1,300 Protestant pastors were arrested by 1938.

Chapter VI, on the "Orthodox Caesaro-papism" of the Russian Church, gives a good perspective upon the problems that face the western world today. It is recommended to the members of the various state departments of the western European nations and the United States as required reading, for the Soviets seem merely to be continuing the messianic nationalism of Russia's long history. In 1880, Dostoevski put it:

> Yes, the vocation of the Russian man is doubtless universal-European and even ecumenical. . . . To become, then, truly Russian means to provide the solution of European contradictions . . . to receive with brotherly love all brothers into his Russian soul, and perhaps even finally to be able to utter the word of universal great harmony, of final brotherly concord between nations, according to Christ's commandments (p. 209).

The understanding of Russian nationalism is so significant to the peace of the world that Baron's findings merit exact quotation:

> For lack of a better term, therefore, we may perhaps designate Russia's peculiar national loyalties as messianic nationalism. Deep down in the heart of almost every great Russian lay dormant the feeling . . . that humanity would ultimately be redeemed by Russia's spirit and by Russia's might. Instinctively the masses, too, were permeated with that sentiment of "manifest destiny" for which they were ready to offer supreme sacrifices. In their quest for mankind's ultimate happiness they forswore pursuit of personal happiness the more readily as centuries of Orthodox asceticism, made realistic by the penury of an overwhelming majority, had instilled in them a sense of guilt for every this-worldly enjoyment. . . . For this reason, too, the ordinary Russian never developed that craving for personal and civil liberties which is so deeply imbedded in the Anglo-Saxon tradition. Unless he went to the extreme of nihilism or anarchism, he generally condemned such liberties . . . as leading to society's atomization and ultimate dissolution. So long, moreover, as he had to fight his centuries-long battles for survival against Tartars or Turks, Poles, Swedes or French, or, more recently, the growing threat of a united Germany, and as, finally under the Soviets, he believed himself constantly menaced by a world conspiracy of capitalist powers, he gladly renounced his individual freedoms in favor of an aristocracy which would see him through the recurrent emergencies.
>
> At the same time the Russians decidedly felt that they belonged to an essentially egalitarian society. . . . This feeling of equality was the more deeply ingrained as Russia had never really gone through the transition from feudalism, with its powerful nobility, to capitalism, with its class divisiveness. It was mightily reinforced by the Communist Revolution's proclamation of a basic economic "democracy" which, because of the professedly temporary autocratic controls, appears so strange to Western democrats thinking primarily in terms of individual and political freedoms. Even in *the religious sphere the Russian had long learned to accentuate not individual conscience but the church's authoritarian teachings and to yearn for universal rather than personal salvation* (p. 210).

The author remains objective when he next analyzes "Jewish religious ethnicism" that peculiar synthesis of nationalism and internationalism with monotheistic assumptions even 2500 years ago. It mattered much that the prophets severed the fate of their people from the destiny of Palestine *which had been given them by God.* The victorious enemy could thus become the rod of God's anger; defeat, divine guidance; and the Jewish people eternal though strangers in a foreign land." The Israelitic prophets and priests may thus be designated the first exponents of a religious nationalism, in which culture was equated

with religion but in which all political aspirations were considered secondary" (p. 214).

Baron is altogether at home in outlining the tragic history of the Jews, and the sections on emancipation and assimilation, varieties of nationalist affirmation, and Zionist renascence contain materials of intrinsic significance. The involvement of Great Britain in Zionism from the MacMahon correspondence of 1915-16 and its promises to the Arabs to the recent decisions regarding partition and restrictions regarding immigration are carefully surveyed. Whether Judaism will continue or surrender its identity and messianic mission against the odds in the modern nationalistically strife-torn world is left in the lap of the gods. Meanwhile, "religion and nationalism are for Jews, not contrasting conflicting categories, . . . but an extraordinary organic wholeness" (p. 248).

The development of German nationalism from Lagarde to Rosenberg is brilliantly described, but its connection with *Volksreligion* and its roots in the thirteenth century Dominican, Meister Eckehart, hardly discerned (see H. Weinel in *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, 5:1616-1626).

The author observes that "almost every ancient religion was a state religion, its gods expanding and disappearing together with the state" (p. 6), and that "the alliance with either nationality or state or, more frequently, with both was the most characteristic feature of ancient religions" (p. 21), and that religion and nationality are for Jews "an extradorniary organic wholeness" (p. 248). The full story, however is that "the medicine man or magician tends to blossom out into a full-blown god and king in one." In ancient Rome the priest was the sacrificial king; in Greece, the king was high priest; the Pharaoh was the earthly counterpart of the gods; Alexander the Great united the concepts of God-king of the Orient with the Savior idea of Hellas, and this was transferred to Jesus as Theos-Soter. Because the state was the highest good, the worship of the emperor was proper and, therefore, the Christians for refusing to do their patriotic duty were called "atheists." In Japan, the emperor, similarly, was and is God. Nazism and fascism did nothing new but merely reverted to what had been (see A. M. Hocart, *Kingship and Kings and Councillors;* D. G. Haring, "The Position of the Ruler in Japan," *Proceedings of the Sixth Pacific Science*

Congress, IV, 1939; T. H. Gaster, "Divine Kingship in the Ancient Near East," *Review of Religion,* March 1, 1945, p. 267). The goal of religion beyond Christianity is usually the integration of society rather than membership in an overworldly kingdom of God. The real significance of religion for most peoples has been social, and religion always reflects society.

Christianity is described as "that greatest fusion of Jewish, Oriental and Graeco-Roman beliefs, ceremonies and ecclesiastical forms . . . ultimately becoming the main leveling factor in the formation of the new all-embracing Roman Catholic civilization" (p. 10). Excellent! But again, the complete story is that Christianity began as an unrecognized religion, became a cultural synthesis which endured to the fifteenth century as Christendom, and during the last five centuries has lost much of its cultural importance, notwithstanding all the efforts of the Roman Catholic hierarchy to retain it. Christianity today is principally a religion (see Moehlman, *The Church as Educator*).

Similarly, the Oriental scholar may be substantially correct in stating that

> all the real achievements of Western civilization, the respect for human personality, the humanitarian movement, the abolition of slavery, individual freedom, the emancipation of women, the ideal of moral purity, the concept of social reform, the rise of democracy, the assault on war, the idea of the League of Nations, have all derived their greatest support and their greatest driving power from those who have drawn their courage and their inspiration and devotion to God and man from the eternal springs of the Bible.

Yet it is also true that the Bible has also been a brake upon progress, and that most progress was registered after science, historical method, and the forces of the modern environment had, on many battle fields, conquered the reaction based upon inherited dogmas.

Communism, it is granted, is a

> full-fledged religion, aiming at superseding all the traditional creeds. Nicholas Berdyaev found among non-Communists few objectors to his assertion that "communism, both as a theory and as a practice, is not only a social phenomenon, but also a spiritual and religious phenomenon. *And it is formidable precisely as a religion*" (p. 200).

Or, as Lunacharski says, "The new religion, the religion of humanity, the religion of toil, has no guarantees, but I suppose that even without God and without guarantees which are but the mask of the same God,

it remains a religion" (p. 332). Now, the consistent application of this broader definition of religion should have led to the conclusion that the only way to solve the problem of nationalism being the *main* religion of the people is the American plan of separation of church and state. For, although democracy is the religion of the majority of Americans, its guaranteed essentials would make dictatorship less omnipotent.

Of course, such valuable notes as are found on page 275 to 344 deserved an index, since the student will run them down quite as much as any chapter of the text.

The skill, the fairness, the scholarship, the insights, the calmness, the objectivity of these pages make the volume both a reference work and a thing of beauty, as well as the envy of all of us who have toiled through the years in the weeds of nationalism without achieving such mastery of detail and of perspective.

CONRAD HENRY MOEHLMAN

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Conflicts of Power in Modern Culture. Edited by LYMAN BRYSON, LOUIS FINKELSTEIN, R. M. MACIVER. New York: Harper Brothers, 1947. xx, 703 pp. $6.50.

This is the seventh symposium published by the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion. It includes sixty-two papers by outstanding scholars and thinkers in the several fields of intellectual discipline. The editors deserve high praise for having made a reasonably coherent book out of numerous papers written from various points of view, dealing with a multitude of matters and more or less related to the subject indicated by the title of the book.

Here, indeed, is a mine of a source book on the winds of doctrine blowing about in our cultural atmosphere. There is everything in this volume, from Charles Morris' study of the human physique in relation to "somatotonia," to Swami Nikhilananda's Hindu mysticism. There are characteristic papers by Hans J. Morgenthau, R. T. Flewelling, T. V. Smith, F. S. C. Northrop, E. S. Brightman, W. Gurian and others. There are fresh and engaging essays by R. J. Havighurst ("The Influ-

ence of Recent Social Changes on the Desire for Mobility in the United States"), by T. V. Smith ("In Accentuation of the Negative"), David Bidney ("Human Nature and Culture"), Louis Wirth ("Ideas and Ideals as Sources of Power in the Modern World"), Quincy Wright ("The Relations of Universal Culture to Power Politics"), and James Marshall ("UNESCO and the Runaway Mount"). The paper on "The Power Concept in Modern Historical Writing" by Fr. Engel-Janosi, and the one on "The Religion of Progress: An Element of Power in Modern Social Movements" by Albert Salomon, especially the latter, are worth anyone's while to read. The paper which comes closest to dealing with the subject of the title of the book, "The Crisis of Peace and Power in the Atom Age" by Karl W. Deutsch, by the way the longest in the book, is a masterpiece of organization and critical thought. The author's proposal for an immediate "international comprehensive disarmament" is well reasoned but indicative of our perplexities rather than of our possibilities. There are a number of papers by specialists dealing with the contributions which their disciplines can make to the mitigation of impulse for power in our culture. The best and the most sober of these seem to us to be: "Certain Primary Sources and Patterns of Aggression in the Social Structure of the Western World" by Talcott Williams, "Anthropology as a Bridge to Intercultural Understanding" by Ralph Linton, "Science and Intercultural Understanding" by Henry N. Russell, and "Education, Politics and the Transformation of Culture" by G. F. Rohrlich. "Science Teaching and the Humanities" by Philipp Frank deserves special mention as a serious attempt to deal with the problem indicated by its title. If the suggestions it makes were known widely and followed, we would be able to decrease to a degree one of the basic schizophreniae in our culture. There is much more in this book. We have said enough to whet the appetite of all but the indifferent.

As a source book and "food for thought" this volume is very good. Otherwise it is a discouraging spectacle. The difficulties with it are as follows: Except in one chapter (LX) it contains no sustained description of the conflicts of power in modern culture. These conflicts are either assumed or sketched briefly here and there. Most of the writers "turn on the record" and repeat their favorite pieces.

The problem of the writers is the *control* of power. They are quite

confident of knowing the nature of power. The few attempts at definition speak of it as the capacity or ability to initiate "changes in the physical and social environment (pp. 76, 434, 608). Such capacity is, of course, natural. Hence the writers know only a natural pursuit of power for certain ends. (The exceptions are the psychologists who see "aggression" as a complex phenomenon.) It appears, therefore, that the only serious problem is how to curb exaggerated impulse for power. In answer to this problem, the "scientists," the anthropologists, the educators, the statesmen, the theologians offer their recommendations, and the task appears all but done. Of course, the more serious writers are aware that their suggestions may not enable us to make a palpable impression upon society, which is in peril of wholesale ruin. But they say what they can, and, as it were, hope for the best.

In the judgment of this reviewer, this volume is an excellent evidence that self-knowledge is all but a lost discipline. The writers see "power conflict" as an objective, social problem. The inner dynamics of the impulse for power, its transformation from a capacity for good into an incapacity to follow reason, its strange impetuosities and "pursuit of death," its relations to metaphysical anxiety and guilty fear, etc., escape their attention and interest. Hence they can make no distinction between power serving a rational good and a lust for power which arises from and is nourished by despair concerning the availability of the good. The lust for power is due to a radical failure of reason in human relations, and unless this failure is acknowledged and understood there can be no effective solution to the problem of power. The writers are aware of the insufficiency of their proposals for the control of power. But since as products and torchbearers of our "scientific" culture, they suffer from a radical inaptitude for understanding "the impulse for power" in themselves, they must be content with remedies which they suspect will not cure.

The objective social process is a plurality of modes of being. There are the psychological, sociological, economic, political, moral, religious dimensions of society. Specialists have their peculiar points of view, their peculiar methods, and bag of facts, their peculiar "operational" truths and corresponding conceptions of "what needs to be done." But they have no way (at least none was evident in this book) of organizing knowledge so as to arrive at commonly acceptable principles. They are

unable to offer a coherent system in which the various types of truth shall find their rightful places. The result is a confusion which gives little promise of effective "control of power" in our culture. The difficulty is not lack of knowledge and ideas. It is not that the brains of our intellegentsia are insufficient for the task at hand. It is rather the writers' ignoring the fact that, in the social life, the unit of reality is the individual, indivisible human being. The unifying principle of reality is man himself, not as he is thought of by another but as he exists in relation to his destiny. You ignore the life of a person as he lives it, then all is fragments and confusion. It now becomes impossible to bring science and humanities together; there is no longer a point of contact between the religious and the secular (as evident in this book); philosophy becomes bankrupt, art unilluminating (art is left out of this book), and science irrelevant. The initial fact about society is the coexistence of human beings. Unless in the analysis of society and its problems this fact is constantly taken seriously, and unless analysis ends in a richer understanding of an integral human being in his relationship to his destiny, the increase of "knowledge" cannot but end in frustration, as it does in this book.

The papers by Hans Morgenthau, Philipp Frank, David Bidney, Albert Salomon, Karl Deutsch, and James Marshall are the most useful in the light of the above reflections. But they are lost in the bedlam of the book as a whole.

It may interest the readers of this journal that, so far as the evidence of this symposium is concerned, "religion" does not have much to contribute to the problem of power in our day. Of course, the churches with their ideals of peace, justice, and brotherhood may have considerable political influence, but their doctrines and theologies are of no consequence in the making of "the modern mind" as reflected by the non-religious papers in this book. Ben Zion Bokser, in a paper on "Rabbinic Judaism and the Problem of Egoism," writes that God has endowed human nature with two impulses: the egoistic and the altruistic. Then he offers certain strategies, such as exhortation and education, which shall increase altruism and decrease egoism. Edifying, but not illuminating. Nels F. S. Ferré, in a paper on "Christianity and the Control of Power," gives a brief analysis of lust for power as rooted in despair. He offers faith in God, "God-security," as antidote to despair

and the desire for power. But belief in "Cosmic Power and Concern" is not shared by his fellow-writers. Hence the only comment made on his paper, by Erwin R. Goodenough of Yale, is that it is mythology. F. S. C. Northrop's "Toward a Religion with Worldwide Transforming Power," in which he argues for a combination of "the esthetic component" of knowledge with the theoretic, thus uniting the East and the West, is touching but futile. In so far as the religious writers champion "ideas and ideals" which are the common property of western traditional culture, no one seems to object to them, but when they speak theology, they seem to be unheard and unheeded.

Our last word must be that this seventh symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion is a rich treasury of scholarly thought variously relevant to the problem of the mitigation of the impulse for power which is the most dangerous single factor in our age.

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BOOK NOTES

An Analysis of Coeur D'Alene Indian Myths. By GLADYS A. REICHARD. Philadelphia: American Folklore Society (Memoir 41) 1947. 216 pp. $4.00.

Professor Reichard of Barnard College obtained Coeur d'Alene materials in northern Idaho in 1927 and 1929. Her first large publication on this group was a grammar, issued in 1938 in the third volume of the *Handbook of American Indian Languages.* The analysis of the myths, her second large publication on Coeur d'Alene, is based upon phonetic transcriptions of about forty myths and a few additional tales, but only the translations are published here. The absence of the phonetic original may be due to an unfortunate weakening of interest in and support given to that kind of documentation, but I hope that before long she may be enabled to publish her phonetic version of these myths, so that other workers in Salishan groups may benefit from their availability.

Perhaps the distinctive contribution in this volume is the second chapter, which lists and discusses poetic, formal, linguistic, and other esthetic components of the literary style. I recall no fuller discussion of an American Indian literature. Dr. Reichard deserves commendation for so careful and detailed a documentation of a much too neglected feature of culture, in the study of which Franz Boas, Paul Radin, and she have done arduous pioneer work.

The major part of the volume is a comparative study of the myths, based upon distribution of episodes and plots noted by Adele Froelich. The oral literatures with which Coeur d'Alene is compared extend from Idaho and Oregon to southern Alaska. These distributions provide supplementation, convenient to comparative folklorists, of Boas's monumental labors in his *Tsimshian Mythology,* and extend our comparative knowledge especially well for the Idaho-Washington-Oregon area peripheral to the Boas work.

In Coeur d'Alene, as in other literatures of the interior of Idaho-Washington-Oregon, the myths were not subjected to the philosophical and artistic reworking accorded the myths of coastal peoples. Elaborations or secondary developments, both theological and esthetic, characteristic of various aspects of culture along the coast, appear to constitute forms of overlay consequent upon historical conditions which ethnology should try to define. In interior districts a simpler cultural base is exemplified by the Coeur d'Alene. We now need a follow-up of research among their neighbors.

Dr. Reichard's study is, therefore, one of the many analytic and comparative researches of a preliminary kind, besides mere collection of descriptive data, to be engaged in before ethnology can formulate dynamic processes of change and development, operative in recent centuries, for the coastal areas. Her analysis leads towards such process-formulations for myth content, literary style, and religious ideology in this part of the world.

Additional theoretic interest emerges upon consideration of the culture

traits cited in myths. Dr. Reichard's study is the first to examine such matters in a folklore of the northwestern United States. Field workers have already noticed, and she exhibits in detail the evidence that folklores of the interior give less frequent phrasing to items of culture than do coastal folklores such as the Tsimshian. Comparison of cultural items reflected in Tsimshian and Coeur d'Alene myths prompts an inquiry as to why a coastal people clothed their myth renderings with so many traits of their culture, whereas interior peoples offered stories in a relatively barer garb.

Very likely some of the key answers to these queries will be located in cultural processes engendered by the superior conditions of living of the coastal communities. But, before ethnologists venture upon such answers, they need much more of the cautious groundbreaking, of an analytic and comparative kind, that has been so well executed in Dr. Reichard's studies.

MELVILLE JACOBS

Alaskan Eskimo Ceremonialism. By MARGARET LANTIS. New York: J. J. Augustin, Inc., 1947. (Monographs of the American Ethnological Society, XI.) xiii, 127 pp. $2.75.

With the exception of the ancient Athenians, probably no other people of such small numbers as the Eskimo—their total population from Greenland to Siberia is less than 35,000—have been so much written about from the seventeenth century to the present day. Yet only two books attempt to deal with the entire culture of the Eskimo, the monographs usually being devoted to a small local group. There are few regional surveys and there were none of the Western Eskimo of the Alaska region, until Miss Lantis made her study.

For this task she was especially well equipped, by reason of residence in the Aleutian Islands and Nunivak, off the Alaska coast, in both of which regions she has made excellent detailed studies of the cultures. The volume under review is an indispensable guide for students of this region concerned with ceremonialism. Readers of this journal will be grateful for the enlightening accounts of magic, religion, ritual, ceremonialism, symbolism, and their various social and psychological expressions or implications.

Ritual and ceremonialism begin with the birth of the child, with prescriptions of washing in cold water, and of bestowing a name. Water, indeed, including salt water, is on many occasions an important medium of ritual purification. Even lip-piercing and tattooing are ritualized, as are the first important acts of the boy or the girl. These rituals establish or affirm "the child's place in relation to society and to the spiritual world." For the boy, the most elaborate ceremony celebrates the first killing of game; for the girl, the first menstruation is the most important occasion. Marriage is not extensively ritualized, but disposal of the dead is highly important, and varies considerably with social classes. Close relatives of a person of high social class give a memorial feast at which food is dispensed without stint from the family stores.

There are secret societies, composed in some communities of all adult males. These societies intimidate the women and the children, and withhold the secrets from them. The women now know the identity of the impersonated spirits designed to frighten them; but probably "once upon a time they were deceived." There were well organized war raids, but little ritual associated with them. "War is one phase of Eskimo culture in which there is a strong suggestion of Indian influence." The sun occupies no place in public ceremony, but the Moon-man, who inhabits the moon, is prominent in the myths. The launching of the boats at the beginning of the season for hunting sea mammals was an important event, accompanied by ritual and ceremony. A cult was associated with whale, bear, walrus, and seal. "Impressive ceremonials, under one name or another, were given to honor and please the animals . . . or the supernatural beings that controlled them, so that the people would continue to have good hunting." Masks, dances, and the presentation of gifts, play important roles.

The student of primitive religion is offered here comprehensive and well ordered information based on all available resources, including the author's own field work, and critical estimates of the values of the respective sources. The summaries and the interpretations leave nothing to be desired. The respective elements of Eskimo religious roles come to life in a functioning totality of beliefs and practices unique in human culture.

WILSON D. WALLIS

The Groundwork of the Gospels. By R. O. P. TAYLOR. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947. xiii, 151 pp. $2.50.

This is essentially an apologetic work, designed to show that the underlying tradition of the Gospels, chiefly Mark, was not produced by the Christian community but is the formal, catechetical statement of the recollections of the apostles, chiefly Peter. There is, of course, no reason why an apologetic work should not also contain good historical research. On the contrary, a secular historian might well write a book to show that "Q" was a real document, that Mark used earlier sources, that the "we-narrative" in Acts drew upon a diary, that John's Passion Narrative is superior to the Synoptic; such books have been written, and no one has suggested that they were "apologetic" in purpose! But the late Provost Taylor's work is a little too one-sided. He drew heavily upon Cuthbert Turner's view of Mark (in Gore's *Commentary*), which was that our earliest Gospel is practically an autobiography of Peter: what Mark wrote was, "they went," "he said," and so on; but what Peter said was "we went," "I heard him say," and so on. There is undoubtedly *some* Petrine recollection back of Mark, but there is a great deal besides, and one may doubt if the theory will account for the Gospel as a whole.

But the book is very interesting, and as diligent a scholar as the Provost of Cumbrae was bound to turn up many significant facts and new twists of inter-

pretation. One of the outstanding contributions is his theory that Mark, as *hupêretês,* was really a catechist, i.e., a teacher of the Christian tradition which converts were to learn by rote. The evidence is drawn from Kittel's *Wörterbuch: hupêretês* was always used to translate *chazzan,* the synagogue-minister who functioned as elementary-school master. It would be the natural term to use for the early church "teacher" of tradition. (But why then does Paul prefer *didaskalos,* using *hupêretês* only once?) Another interesting suggestion is that the language of Eusebius, quoting Papias, who quoted the "elder" John: ὃς πρὸς τὰς χρείας ἐποιεῖτο τὰς διδασκαλίας meant, not "as needed" but "for the *Chreias,*" a "chreia" being "a pregnant sentence, frequently illustrated by an anecdote." This is interesting, and the student of Hellenistic literature will find a good account of the chreia-literature, with translation of relevant passages from some of the old books of rhetoric, the *Progumnasmata* (pp. 82 ff, tr. by T. Nicklin). But (1) *are* the pericopes in Mark really *chrienartig,* as some scholars maintain? The saying, in the Gospels, usually comes at the *end* of the anecdote—in Vincent Taylor's terminology, these are "pronouncement-stories;" and the jewel is a pendant, not a set-stone. Further, (2) what became of the term in Christian literature generally? Would Papias or the elder have referred to *chreias* if no other Christian ever did? It is a technical term in Greek rhetoric, and scarcely belongs in Christian literature.

The old debate over the use of Greek in Palestine, and especially in Galilee in the first century, is continued. Taylor holds that Jesus spoke Greek, and that the sayings in the Gospels are his *ipsissima verba.* But the evidence (better for the second century than for the first: see Saul Lieberman, *Greek in Jewish Palestine,* New York, 1942) is not sufficient, I believe, to bear the weight placed upon it, and in one place (p. 6) what Schürer said of Greek as the language of the (western) Diaspora synagogues seems to be used to support the view that it was the language of the Galilean synagogues as well.

There is much in the book that is suggestive, even fanciful, and the argument is driven too hard; at the same time, it is a good corrective for some of the popular misconceptions of the place of tradition in the early Church, and also for some of the purely "literary" notions of the production of the Gospels —which were certainly "church books" from the start, and incorporated what had long been the fixed, scarcely altered *paradosis* of the Greek-speaking churches. Their place was in the worship and instruction of the church, not in the bookshops of the great cities (cf. ch. vii). They were meant to be historical —but historical in the biblical or religious sense, not as mere records of the past but as proclamations of God's saving work. "God's Revelation is not given in doctrines ready-made to be accepted as they stand. It is given in certain historical events to which the written records of the Bible bear witness, which challenge the reason to account for them on any other hypothesis than that they are mighty acts of God wrought out for us men and our salvation" (p. xii, quoted from Professor Leonard Hodgson). This, surely, is the view the evangelists took of the significance of the materials they were using.

FREDERICK C. GRANT

The Invisible Encounter. By IGOR I. SIKORSKY. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947. 120 pp. $2.00.

In this slender volume one of the world's foremost airplane designers makes his plea for spiritual rather than material power as the great need of our day. In his preface, Mr. Sikorsky says, "Mankind is now passing through a crisis of unprecedented depth and magnitude. . . . The main cause can be traced to a deep inner dislocation in the moral and spiritual sphere of existence." The work is then devoted to a discussion of the nature of this crisis and its inner causes.

The context of the discussion is the narrative from the New Testament dealing with the temptation of Jesus in the wilderness. The author dramatically indicates how each question posed in this narrative is a direct challenge to Jesus as he was deciding between two interpretations of his role as the Messiah. He could base his vocational aims either on the promise of economic relief, miracles, and totalitarian methods, or on an appeal to man's rational, moral, and religious consciousness. "In this fundamental question Christ recognized not human discord, but conflict between the ways of heaven and hell. He refused to make the slightest compromise and, in fact, greatly sharpened the conflict." This conclusion becomes for Mr. Sikorsky the clue to his solution of the contemporary crisis.

The alternatives are discussed in various ways. When he is the exegete, the author shows the parallels which exist between the temptation story and the Lord's Prayer, the latter topic having been treated in a previous volume. When he treats the historical background of the conflict with which Jesus was struggling, the writer brings into focus much material which is indispensable to an understanding of the passage in question. The political situation of the Jews during the period preceeding the dispersion, based upon citations from the historian, Josephus, is treated generously. The inner conditions of the Roman Empire are also touched upon, particularly as these conditions affected Palestine. In a further use of homiletical methods, Mr. Sikorsky relates literary expressions to the basic conflict, noting relevant passages from Dostoyevsky's "Legend of the Great Inquisitor," Heinrich Heine, Lin Yutang, and several other widely different prose writers of the modern period.

The prescription proposed in the present spiritual crisis is implicit throughout his diagnosis. The section titled "the way out" is consequently very brief, and, on first sight, appears over-simplified. It is this: "the world can be saved only by a forceful ideological reorientation"; or, to use his reference to Abraham Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address, it can be saved only by making a new start "with malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right."

J. EDWARD DIRKS

Paul's Epistle to the Romans. By E. F. SCOTT. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947. 125 pp. $2.00.

In this brief introduction and companion to Romans, Professor Scott has attempted to strip off the "wrappings of ancient thought and language" and fix

attention on the main intention of the letter, which is "essentially a modern book." In his set task he has succeeded remarkably well, and his volume provides a first-rate orientation for religious inquiry into a difficult piece of writing. Two things the book does particularly well: it uncovers the person, Paul, behind the sometimes difficult reasoning of the letter; and it fixes attention on Paul's concept of God's action in Christ.

Professor Scott deals with the character of Paul especially in his first chapter, "The Origin and Purpose of the Epistle." Here he shows in detail how the letter was not intended to be a balanced statement of theology, but was directed to a particular situation and aimed to prepare the way for a new stage in Paul's career. In the process, Professor Scott illuminates Paul's active and sympathetic personality in many ways. Insights into Paul's character are frequent elsewhere, as in the note on Paul's defense of his erstwhile opponents, the Jews (p. 63).

The discussion of faith as directed to God's historical action, rather than toward a system of theology or philosophy, is a frequent theme in the book. The author has seized on the idea of faith in what God has done as the key to the letter, and as the great contribution of the writing to the modern religious seeker. The concluding pages provide a fine summary of this theme: "All that he attempts is to proclaim something which God has now done. . . . Our faith is anchored, not to any guess or speculation, but to something done by God in the sight of all the world" (pp. 120-21). The entire section merits careful reading.

It may be that, the author in stripping off the ancient thought-forms, has stripped off some things that can still have suggestiveness and meaning. He rightly emphasizes that Paul proclaimed a "fact." Yet this fact was perceived in a context, and the interpreter may miss valuable insights if he too easily transfers the concepts he values to a modern context. In particular, there are two aspects of Paul's thought which he treats inadequately, which may yet be relevant to the situation of man today. These we may label the categories of history and community.

Scott rightly sees that Paul had a concept of universal history, but he neglects Paul's conviction that a particular area of history, the history of God's dealings with his people, was of unique significance. For Paul, however, there was in this very particularism a clue to the universalism of his hope. Paul's preoccupation with the Law and with the fate of Israel were more than "illustrations." He conceived of God's action as a process, so that neither the event of Christ (rightly seen as historic by Professor Scott) nor the universal stage which it inaugurated could be dissociated from the specific past of Israel.

Further, the community, and specifically the "new Israel" of the Church, are lightly treated by Professor Scott. Here he largely follows the analysis of his earlier book, *Man and Society in the New Testament,* and stresses the absolute significance of the individual. Much of this emphasis is genuinely drawn from his source, and it is needed in these days of collectivism (though one may not concur in the specific applications to politics and economics made by the au-

thor). Yet the question arises whether the community in Paul's thought has received its due. In particular, there can be in the community a link between the faith so warmly described and the past event in which it must be rooted.

WILLIAM A. BEARDSLEE

Acta Dioecesis Holmiensis; Till belysning av kyrko- och församlingsstyrelsen i Stockholm. By DAVID LINDQUIST. Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1947. 158 pp. Kr. 6.00.

Not only does the country of Sweden have a history that goes back to very early times, but its people, and especially its scholars, are also historically minded, and there is hardly any phase of the life of that nation which has not been the subject for minute investigations. The volume under review (published by the University of Lund) deals with the ecclesiastical situation in the city of Stockholm during the first half of the seventeenth century. At that time the city itself came into greater prominence than ever before. It now became, in every sense of the word, the capital of the nation, and the home and center of all its administrative bureaus and departments. This resulted in a rapid increase in population, and this, in turn, necessitated a reformation of the civil government of the city. It now became evident that the ecclesiastical affairs within the city also stood in need of reorganization. Not only did existing conditions demand this, but, in some quarters, there was a strong desire to make Stockholm the center also of the Church of the land.

The author presents in detail the various rules and regulations adopted by the authorities of the Church for the guidance of the clergy and the congregations in Stockholm. The book is interesting, not only from the point of view of church polity, but also because incidentally it gives the reader an insight into the conditions of the people in general. At the end of the volume there is a convenient Summary of ten pages, a *Zusammenfassung*, written in German, thus making the main content of the book available for a larger number of readers than otherwise would have been the case.

C. G. CARLFELT

The Meaning of Love. By VLADIMIR SOLOVYEV. New York: International Universities Press, 1947. 82 pp. $1.75.

The philosophical ideas of Vladimir Solovyev have had a great influence upon Russian religious and philosophical thought and have inspired an entire school of writers, of whom perhaps the best known is Nicholas Berdyaev. In this work Solovyev has tried to work out a theory of the significance of love and of sex in accordance with his general principles, and his conclusions stand or fall with the general decision as to the validity of his methods.

His thought revolves about the regeneration, not only of the individual man or of the human race, but of the entire universe. For him the Incarna-

tion is more important than the Atonement, and he looks forward to the time when the growing awareness of man of the potentialities of the universe and of the human spirit will inaugurate a new period in the history of humanity and of religion. For him, therefore, love and sex acquire a mystical and a religious content, into which there vanishes almost without a trace all of those unessential details which to other thinkers must assume superlative importance.

Thus in his discussions of love and of sex, Solovyev is little interested in those aspects which often are taken to be fundamental. To him, sex is something more than a device for reproduction or for the development of family life. It is a means of overcoming the egoism of the individual and, at its best, approaches that mystical union which exists between Christ and the Church. The physical aspects of sex are merely the untransformed remains of the old animal order subject to decay and death. They are hardly to be mentioned in the newer and higher order which he postulates. From this point of view, any interest and concern with the body and not the soul of the loved one becomes merely an even more decadent form of fetichism than those studied by psychologists and psychiatrists.

The object of sex is the development of a purely religious conception which eliminates the egoism of the individual and breaks down the barriers of time and space and all that separates one individual from another and from God. It is for this purpose that God created the male and female as joint parts of an hitherto unrecognized unity. Perhaps there is much of the Platonic theory of the soul in this, for Solovyev was a deep student, not only of Plato, but of the gnostics and similar schools of thought.

From this point of view, he succeeds brilliantly in demonstrating his ideas, but he recognizes clearly that, at the present stage of human development, his ideas can be understood and have sense for only a small fraction of the human race; but it is to them, to those individuals who can faintly grasp the potentialities of a transformed universe that Solovyev is writing. As so often in the books of men of this school, there is a deceptive simplicity, a tendency to substitute the abstract for the concrete which will baffle the reader.

Here Solovyev is speaking of sex, of the eternal, timeless relations between male and female, and he has only scorn for those who rest either on the purely physical animal interpretation or on the social order which has been created by man in contradiction to the animals. He is viewing the mystical and religious aspect of sex, separated from all of its natural and unregenerate phenomena, from its physical manifestations and its connections with family life. To him sex becomes a philosophical concept closely connected with the immanence of God in the spiritual universe, and he has little guidance or advice for those mortals who are concerned with this present life and have difficulty in grasping the idea of a transformation of the physical universe and the human potentialties to form a newer and higher whole.

C. A. M.

God Confronts Man in History. By HENRY SLOANE COFFIN. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1947. 154 pp. $2.50.

Five of the chapters of this book are the Joseph Cook Lectures on Christianity, delivered by the author in the Philippines, China, Siam, India, and Egypt in 1946-47. They contain, in mere outline, a clear, simple, often strikingly worded, traditional presentation of Christianity. One wonders just how thoughtful Orientals, more particularly the non-Christians, felt as they went away from this presentation of the Christian religion. The author remarks that, in India (where there is much careful thought on religious matters) non-Christians left after the second lecture.

There is an undercurrent of critical implication running through these lectures, the exclusive finality of Christianity (pp. 48, 72, for example). While it is true that Dr. Coffin makes some friendly remarks about contributions which Asia has made to our faith, still, the question may be raised whether he has thought through the implications of the new Christian strategy which appears in his friendly gestures. His characterization of Hinduism (pp. 22, 23) is in the old fashion, in terms which have no redeeming features. Likewise, his few lines on mysticism (p. 43) do not indicate that he hopes to get anything there, either. Islam merely takes him into world politics. China is colorless religiously. Apparently Dr. Coffin is not interested in the non-Christian religions. Why, then, discuss the Christian religion with their followers?

It is pertinent to ask: Can the requirement that the Joseph Cook Lectures must be a defense of Christianity be met *only* by an apologetic of the traditional sort?

GEORGE W. BRIGGS

Prayer and The Lord's Prayer. By CHARLES GORE. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947. xv, 124 pp. $1.25.

The Cloud of Unknowing. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948. xxvii, 146 pp. 150 pp.

Truly, Harper & Brothers are to be congratulated on the charming format of these pocket editions of important religious works, with their golden jackets, their fine paper, and clear, handsome type, which makes them practically irresistible!

The one by Bishop Gore, of Oxford, consists of a group of devotional lectures published half a century ago. In his Introduction, Bishop Angus Dun describes the author as a true "Liberal Catholic," sympathetic to the Catholic revival in the Church of England, but not to the extremes of "ritual lawlessness" in vogue in some quarters. He was a good middle-of-the-road Anglican. In the first essay, "The Efficacy of Prayer," the author gives eloquent answers to some of the "rational" objections against prayer, and states that its real object is "to educate us in intercourse with God." His analysis of The Lord's Prayer is a rare synthesis of scholarship and deep religious feeling.

The second book is an abridged version (in a modern translation by an anonymous Quaker) of a fourteenth century manual of mystical devotion. Its unknown author, a disciple of the Pseudo-Dionysius, believes implicitly in man's ability to pierce "the cloud of unknowing" which hides the Creator, and to attain to mystical union with Him. A modern reviewer may well be abashed by the opening words:

> Whoever you are who possess this book in any way—whether you own it, or have borrowed it, or simply carry it for another—I charge you by a vow of love, that you will not willfully read it, nor write it, nor speak it, nor even permit it to be read, written or spoken by anyone else, nor to any other person, except by one whose purpose, in your judgment, is to become a perfect follower of Christ. By that I do not mean a person who is devoted only to deeds of mercy, but one whose purpose is to come to the pure contemplation of God. . . (p. 3).

A modern reader may also be somewhat repelled by the monkish author's uncompromising exaltation of the contemplative life at the expense of the active. It is instructive to note that, even in the fourteenth century, there were those who did not agree with this evaluation, for he says: "Just as Martha complained of Mary her sister, just so today do all those living active lives complain of contemplatives. This is a common complaint of all peoples of the world whether they be religious or secular—there is none excepted" (pp. 69 f.).

The author rises to unexpected heights of psychological penetration in his discussion of Mary Magdalene, who, he states, was "made meek by the marvellous and wondrous greatness of God," rather than by her own consciousness of sin.

> Did she come down from the heights of her desire for God and into the deeps of her sinful life and search in the foul stinking swamps and dunghills of her sins, digging them up one by one, with all the circumstances surrounding them, and sorrow and weep over them each one by itself? No, most surely she did not do this. Why? Because God let her know by His grace within her soul that she would never come to His Presence in this way. . . (pp. 98 f.).

Thus, like most of the great mystics, he puts more emphasis on man's perfectibility than on his depravity.

M. B.

A Humanist Funeral Service. By Corliss Lamont. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1947. 32 pp. $1.00.

Since 1932, Corliss Lamont has published three books on what men can say in the face of death, if they do not believe in personal immortality. He has, thus, taken unusual care to clarify his Humanist convictions on this point. And here, in this short manual, he brings his results to bear on the delicate problem of "a funeral service centering around a non-supernatural, Humanist philosophy of existence."

A Foreword briefly and clearly states the author's guiding ideas: "man's kinship with Nature, the naturalness of death and the far-reaching social interrelations and ideals of human living." He has sought to provide the outlines for a simple service that avoids "sentimentality, showiness and somberness." In his "Meditation" passages, in my opinion, he has not sufficiently passed beyond the plain exposition of his principles to a truly ceremonial application of them. Furthermore, for my feeling, he develops the theme of death's naturalness with unnecessary reiteration and detail, while he does not give strong enough attention and emphasis to the surviving human ties.

But we all know how differently individuals feel about these matters today, even within the same family. Mr. Lamont has, therefore, been wise to provide for much variation of sentiment—always within the bounds of Humanism—in the alternative poetry and music included as "additional selections" from which to choose. His own predilection seems almost perfectly expressed in the lines quoted from John Masefield's *The Passing Strange* just before the closing music of the service. It might give further help to users of this manual, if the "additional selections" were grouped according to dominant themes.

As one reads the poetry assembled, one can not help feeling what a tremendous and utter challenge death brings. How it judges us and all our poetry, as we try to judge it! Yet there is evidence here that men sometimes do succeed in expressing deep and strong answers to death. Within the limits of a naturalistic Humanism, there are attitudes, thoughts, and convictions that stand up to the challenge. Mr. Lamont is certainly working on a problem, as fruitful as it is difficult, in undertaking to assemble answers of this quality, that may appeal to those unable to use liturgies built upon hopes of supernatural immortality.

H. L. F.

Time and Eternity. By Ananda K. Coomaraswamy. Ascona, Switzerland: Artibus Asiae, 1947, 140 pp. $4.80.

Dr. Coomaraswamy traces the conception of a stable reality beyond the world of change through a variety of cultures. He quotes a large number of authors, from both East and West, who seem to share in the conception of an eternal *nunc stans*. Because he seeks for fundamental agreement among authors as diverse as Aristotle, Meister Eckhardt, and the Vedantists, he concentrates on the formal aspects of the notion of eternity with little regard to the difference of cultural contexts in which the term was used. The book is rich in quotations, too much so. One would have preferred the author to discuss much more fully the significance of his texts.

But this reviewer's main quarrel with the book is that it takes the conception of eternity literally. This seems to be the one approach which, at the present time, does not promise to be especially fruitful. It compares unfavor-

ably, for instance, with those investigations which try to establish the metaphorical, rather than the literal, meaning of the conception, as Santayana has done so brilliantly.

If the notion of a transcendent *nunc stans* is taken literally, then the contradictions into which this author, with a host of others, falls are unavoidable. At the very beginning he must claim a knowledge which, as they themselves have postulated, they cannot have. Thus our author distinguishes (p. 2) an eternity as it appears to "*our* temporal point of view" and as it is "*in itself* (italics mine). Ultimately this approach leads to situations in which self-contradictory assertions are readily accepted. To the objection that the satisfaction of desires in the realm of eternity would be meaningless because the needs that prompted them would no longer exist, the author answers (p. 135) by quoting that God "infinitely wanteth all His joys . . . and all those wanted pleasures He infinitely hath." Presence and absence of satisfaction are taken to be simultaneous, and this, it is said, "supplies the answer" to the objection.

Another device is to claim for eternity that "it is a matter of experience for those who speak of it so certainly" (p. 126). This reviewer knows of no respectable "experience" in which there is validation for the *coincidentia oppositorum* referred to in the preceding paragraph. But quite apart from that, the claim of a special experience does not provide that convenient weapon it is often thought to provide against those who deny one's propositions. For the having of an experience does in no way entail that one is also able to give a correct *interpretation* of it.

In reading this book, as in so many similar ones, one cannot escape the impression that, for all its implied opposition to materialism, it is, in some respects, only another version of it. The notion of eternity, that is, the "metaphysical," not the poetical notion of eternity, in spite of its dialectical disguises, seems to be hopelessly quantitative in character. It promises more durable goods than the ordinary materialist can. Romantic rapaciousness is never very far from the dialectical notion of eternity, and (pp. 124 ff.) our author joins those whose desire for spiritual *Lebensraum* has made them demand the simultaneous possession of all being as the ultimate goal of their aspiration. Such an approach would perhaps best be called *supermaterialism*, rather than supernaturalism. May it also be that "idealists" and "materialists" argue so interminably with each other because they have so much in common, and hence both find it difficult to understand philosophies which avoid their reductivisms?

In concluding, it must be stated that the literal conception of eternity is not itself sustained by literalness. It is its implied values and emotions which account for the logical blind spots, the acceptance of what would otherwise quite readily be seen as logically untenable. The arguments cannot be "refuted" therefore by a mere literal critique, for the ardor which sustains them is itself not literal but symbolic in meaning.

JOSEPH KATZ

AMONG THE PERIODICALS

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